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When and how does political persuasion employed by authoritarian regimes influence the 
attitudes and behavior of domestic and foreign audiences? Focusing on China, this disserta-
tion comprises three essays in which the effectiveness of political persuasion in public edu-
cation and mass media was examined. The overarching finding is that the Chinese regime’s 
persuasive efforts are more effective among citizens who have familial connections to state 
patronage, who are predisposed to be regime-friendly, and who hold relatively weak polit-
ical positions. By contrast, China-related persuasion often has a limited effect, sometimes 
even backfiring, for people who l ack these background c haracteristics. A  wide range of 
methodological approaches was adopted in this dissertation, including randomized con-
trolled trials, natural experiments, survey research, and qualitative interviews. The find-
ings reveal the potential and limits of the regime’s propaganda and indoctrination, showing 
how persuasion works and among which segment of the population it works best. Despite 
devoting considerable resources to projecting influence both domestically and abroad, the 
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When and how does China-related political persuasion influence the attitudes, opin-
ions, and behavior of both domestic and foreign citizens? Political leaders in China have
long been mindful of creating favorable public opinion and a positive public image. In
China, virtually every conceivable medium that produces, transmits, and conveys informa-
tion to the public falls under the country’s propaganda system.1 Outside its borders the
Chinese government in recent years has annually invested as much as 1.3 billion US dollars
in increasing the global presence of Chinese media (ReportersWithout Borders, 2019). The
government also buys space in foreign media outlets to publish news articles and adver-
tisements that are camouflaged as standard news stories (Dai and Luqiu, 2020).
The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of China’s persuasive efforts is mixed: some
scholars find that exposure to proregime messages sways people in the intended direction,
but others show that the impact of propaganda is negligible and even counterproductive. In
addition, little well-identified evidence tells us whether China’s media influence operations
are effective. Together, the current state of the literature indicates that the key question is
not merely whether China-related persuasion can successfully shape political attitudes and
behavior but also when and how it can do so.
Moreover, studying the effect of political persuasion on individuals ismethodically chal-
lenging because people’s information consumption is highly selective. People who choose
1As such, propaganda does not carry negative connotations for the Chinese government and most citizens.
The scope of propaganda oversight includes news and media departments (e.g., newspaper offices, radio
stations, television stations, and magazines), educational organs (e.g., universities, middle schools, primary
schools, vocational or specialized education, and cadre training), cultural organs (e.g., film/drama theaters,
clubs, film production studios, and musical/theatrical troupes), and cultural facilities and commemoration
exhibition facilities (Shambaugh, 2007, pp. 27-28).
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to tune in to certain persuasive messages may differ systematically in ways that matter to
their political attitudes and behavior from those who do not. This endogeneity issue viti-
ates the ability to disentangle cause from effect. The three essays in this dissertation are a
collection of my efforts to address the empirical challenges as well.
The central argument in this dissertation is that the impact of China-related persuasion
is conditional on the message recipients’ predispositions. In contrast to previous scholar-
ship that adopted a hypodermic needle model in which individuals are treated as passive
recipients of persuasive messages, I emphasize the role of human agency in processing and
reacting to information received. In other words, most people (even those living in au-
thoritarian countries like China) are not passive but active audiences. My core finding in
this dissertation is that China-related persuasive messages are more effective when they
tap into people’s political predispositions and reach people whose predispositions are rela-
tively weak. By contrast, persuasive messages tend to have a limited effect, even backfiring,
for people who are dismissive of the Chinese regime ex ante and those who find the mes-
sages incompatible with their actual experiences. In sum, despite devoting considerable
resources to projecting influence both domestically and abroad, the Chinese government
could win the hearts and minds of targets only under certain conditions. My use of a wide
range of issue domains and methodological approaches helps generate a robust empirical
foundation for this conclusion.
In Chapter 2, I focus on China’s political education and its influences on students. For-
mal education is a central tool for government-sponsored indoctrination. Political elites
choose and adjust educational content to fulfill their goals, such as promoting state-sanctioned
ideologies and compliance with political rule. How effective is this state indoctrination? I
conduct a quasiexperimental analysis exploiting the sharp variation in textbook content
generated by China’s most recent curriculum reform to examine the causal effect of politics
textbooks on students’ political attitudes. Building upon research on motivated reasoning
and family socialization, I argue that only those individuals whose parents have connec-
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tions to political patronage are subject to state indoctrination because their proregime biases
transmitted fromparents induce higher receptivity ex ante to governmentmessages. Results
based on a national survey show that the new politics textbooks successfully affected only
those individuals whose parents had worked for the government. The findings not only
highlight the role of intergenerational transmission in moderating the effectiveness of state
indoctrination but also cast doubt on the actual degree to which regimes can change minds
by changing educational content.
In Chapter 3, I examine the electoral effect of a major pro-Beijing media outlet on voters.
One common approach to launching overseas information campaigns is the cooptation of
foreign media outlets to disseminate preferred messages. I use a field experiment during
the 2020 Taiwanese presidential election to examine whether and how a major pro-Beijing
media outlet influenced individuals’ vote choices and opinions about China. Weeks before
the election, I randomly provided voters with real-time political news articles from the pro-
Beijing media outlet on a website and tracked their exposure patterns using web traffic
data. Results based on a panel survey at the individual level show that pro-Beijing news
nudgedpeople exposed to it to vote forChina’s preferred candidate and adoptmore positive
attitudes towardChina. Yet the pro-Beijingmedia outlet in this study had a negligible effect,
sometimes even backfiring, for voters who had been dismissive of China ex ante and those
who think this media outlet is affiliated with the Chinese government.
In Chapter 4, I investigatewhether Chinese business elites increase tax compliancewhen
they are prompted by persuasive information about a recent expansion of government re-
sponsiveness in local China. Results based on a survey experiment of prospective business
elites in China show that the information has a negative impact on people’s willingness to
pay taxes. My interviews suggest that the backlash seems driven by people’s views of the
information as the government’s propagandamessage contradicting their beliefs. The find-
ings not only offer evidence of the fiscal social contract in an authoritarian context but also
demonstrate a case in which people negatively react to proregime messages arguably used
3
to increase citizen compliance.
The findings of this dissertation yield several important implications. First, the empirical
results of the conditional persuasion suggests that political leaders in authoritarian coun-
tries likeChina invest resources in propaganda and state indoctrinationmay aim to reinforce
people who are already existing believers of the regime rather than expanding the popular
base of the regime. Second, the evidence on the backfire effect contributes to the litera-
ture on the potential backlash effect of exposure to dissimilar political information. Some
new studies involving the case of the United States indicate that political persuasion rarely
backfires even under the most desirable conditions (Guess and Coppock, 2018; Wood and
Porter, 2019), but this dissertation shows that the boomerang effect is not elusive. Future
work can identify the conditions under which the unintended consequences of an attempt
to persuade are more likely to occur.
4
Chapter 2
Family Matters: Education and the Conditional Effect of
State Indoctrination in China
2.1 Introduction
Formal education is a central tool for government-sponsored indoctrination. In both
democracies and autocracies, political elites choose and adjust educational content to fulfill
their political goals, such as promoting state-sanctioned ideologies and compliance with
authoritarian rule (Cantoni et al., 2017; Lott, 1999; Testa, 2018; Voigtländer and Voth, 2015),
molding national identity and citizenship (Darden andGrzymala-Busse, 2006;Huang, 2019a;
Naval, Print and Veldhuis, 2002; Nozaki, 2008), stirring up patriotism during political crises
(Ben-Porath, 2007; Rosen, 1993), and teaching the ideas of civil liberty, procedural fairness,
and voting (Niemi and Junn, 1998).
How effective is this state indoctrination? A study by Cantoni et al. (2017) uses China’s
most recent high school curriculum reform to examine the causal effect of a set of new pol-
itics textbooks on students’ attitudes. The reform has brought notable variation in the con-
tent of political education offered to students; more importantly, the new curriculum was
introduced to provinces in different years, helping researchers to account for unobservable
cross-cohort and cross-province differences that may otherwise confound the impact of the
curriculum change. Cantoni and his colleagues concluded that the new politics textbooks
successfully changed students’ political attitudes in the direction intended by the Chinese
government.
Despite their prominence in the field, evidence presented by Cantoni et al. (2017) is
based on students from China’s most prestigious university, Peking University, which nat-
urally raises the question of whether their results can be generalized to the effects of the
5
new textbooks on other Chinese students exposed to them. I use a national survey with
a more representative sample to answer this question. A wide variety of respondents in
the national survey also enable me to evaluate which segment of the population on which
propaganda works best. In addition, most students surveyed in their study were just out of
high school, but respondents in this study have mainly graduated from universities. I thus
have much leverage to examine whether the treatment effect (if any) is sticky over time. In
sum, this paper provides a critical test of Cantoni et al. (2017).
I argue that the receptivity of individuals to government-sponsored indoctrination is
conditional on their familial connections to state patronage. Scholars of information pro-
cessing have claimed that people’s susceptibility to persuasion depends on whether the
messages tap into their predispositions (Kunda, 1990). Political socialization scholarship
has also established that parents play a pivotal role in shaping the political predispositions
of their children (Hyman, 1959). When parents are connected to state patronage, the child
is more likely attached to the regime and possesses higher receptivity ex ante to government
messages. More generally, family socialization could affect differential responses of young
people to political propaganda.
I employ a generalized difference-in-differences design that leverages provincial varia-
tion in the timing of curriculum reform and cohort variation in new curriculum eligibility.
I restrict attention to individuals who started high school around the curriculum reform
years. Because these people straddled the period in which the reform was implemented,
they were differentially exposed to the textbook content depending on school entry years.
I compare attitudes targeted in the new politics textbooks of those who were just young
enough to study the new textbooks and those who were just too old to study them. Under
the assumption that the group characteristics are effectively identical, disparity in targeted
attitudes across the two groups could be attributable to the curriculum change.
Based on changes in textbook content and data availability, I examine three main politi-
6
cal attitudes that the governmentwished to shape.1 Results show that the new textbooks af-
fected only those whose parents had worked for the government. Among the government-
affiliated students (hereafter affiliated students), those learning from the new textbooks
are more inclined than those learning from the old ones to (1) support government inter-
vention in citizen life, (2) accept socialist democracy, and (3) trust government officials.
By contrast, the new textbooks had no demonstrable effect on those whose parents are not
government employees — the great majority of the population. Indeed, when using the
sample where both affiliated and nonaffiliated students are pooled together, the effects are
nearly null. My findings are robust to a wide range of additional analyses. Two falsifica-
tion tests further confirm the identification of the treatment effect. I also discuss four main
alternative explanations of the results in this paper.
For the majority of the respondents whose parents are unaffiliated, the textbook change
made no difference whatsoever. My finding thus contrasts with the conclusion of Can-
toni et al. (2017). Why do the two studies yield different results? One possibility is that
Peking University may overrepresent affiliated students because it is the most prestigious
university in the country. Indeed, 54% of the Cantoni sample had parents in the Chi-
nese Communist Party. A recent survey from Peking University also shows that cadre in
party-government organs and public institutions has become the most common occupa-
tion among the students’ parents since 1997 (Liang and Lee, 2012). Add in students whose
parents are connected to state patronage and the Cantoni sample becomes something of a
complement to the national survey used in this paper. In the concluding section, I discuss
two other possible reasons that may explain the different results, including different years
of reform covered and effect duration.
1The changed textbook content will be discussed in a later section. Admittedly, the new textbooks contain
more new topics than what I study, but because the national survey used in this paper was not designed
to assess the impact of the curriculum change, the variables pertaining to the new textbooks are under con-
straint.
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2.2 When and How is Government Propaganda Effective?
2.2.1 Motivated Political Reasoning
Individuals’ political priors matter with regard to receptivity to persuasion. People pro-
cess and examine new messages in a biased manner to uphold their priors (Ditto and
F. Lopez, 1992; Kunda, 1990; Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979; Nickerson, 1998; Taber and
Lodge, 2006). They are less skeptical consumers of a message consistent with their priors:
they use limited cognitive efforts to evaluate the validity of the message, judge it as relevant
and reliable, give undueweight to evidence in themessage that supports their expectations.
By contrast, people allocate more cognitive resources to thinking about a challenging mes-
sage, focus on its weaknesses, and scrutinize its argument hypercritically.2 The existence
of motivated reasoning suggests that state propaganda may exert its intended effects only
among people with proregime biases but fails to do so among those without adequate bi-
ases.
Although the argument that propaganda is effective among peoplewith higher receptiv-
ity ex ante is not new, individuals’ political predispositions in most prior studies are crudely
inferred from macrolevel factors, such as political regimes and resident districts.3 For in-
stance, some studies claim that people’s past socialization under a certain political regime
nurtures their priors against a new regime’s propaganda (Bleck andMichelitch, 2017; Ged-
des and Zaller, 1989). Other studies show that people born in districts where anti-Semitism
was historically high were particularly susceptible to Nazi indoctrination because of their
existing prejudices (Adena et al., 2015; Voigtländer and Voth, 2015). In contrast to these
studies, I focus on a microlevel factor — individuals’ family socialization— that better cap-
tures the nature of people’s political predispositions.
2This does not mean that people never accept persuasion that challenges their priors, but because people react
to the messages with excessive skepticism, the messages require stronger and more unanticipated evidence
than necessary to induce people to believe them (Chiang and Knight, 2011; Huang, 2015b).
3Peisakhin and Rozenas (2018) is one exception.
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2.2.2 Intergenerational Transmission of Political Predispositions
Families and parents are commonly viewed as the "foremost among agencies of social-
ization into politics" (Hyman, 1959, p.69). Parents transmit attitudes that they consider
valuable for their children to hold, presenting examples or models that children may em-
ulate (Hess and Torney-Purta, 1967). When parents have a close link to the polity (in the
form of public employment for instance), they more enthusiastically promulgate values
that support political authority (Merelman, 1980). In addition to value transmission, par-
ents situate their children in a sociopolitical environment where the latter develop attitudes
as a result of the life experiences that accompany the inherited environment. The shared
environment facilitates parent-child attitudinal similarity (Hout, 1984). As far as utility
maximization is concerned, people think like their parents politically because they expect
to have experiences with the regime similar to those of their parents (Achen, 2002).
Parental transmission of political predispositions is a staple in the field of political social-
ization. Although many studies have shown that parent-child correspondence on political
values is more limited than socialization researchers expected, they mostly agree that chil-
dren’s political attachments are highly congruent with those of their parents (Alford, Funk
and Hibbing, 2005; Jennings and Niemi, 1968; Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 2009; Niemi
and Jennings, 1991).
2.2.3 Cooptation in the Form of Political Patronage
What kinds of parents are likely to hold proregime biases? A large body of literature
has shown that elites in developing and authoritarian states can exploit public employment
via such methods as controls over recruitment, promotion, and retirement of government
posts to create stakeholders in the status quo (Blaydes, 2010; Kitschelt andWilkinson, 2007;
Greene, 2007; Svolik, 2012). Public employment is a main channel through which govern-
ments allocate state patronage to garner popular support (Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Gim-
pelson and Treisman, 2002; Remmer, 2007).
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The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) uses the bianzhi system to control the amount
of official employment in managing the scope of state patronage (Burns, 2003, p.777); it
comprises all positions officially created. Following previous work, I define government
employees as personnel serving in the Party, the government, and public institutions (Ang,
2012).4 In China, working units in the Party and governmental organs can be divided into
core bureaus (jiguan danwei) and public institutions (shiye danwei). Core bureaus, which are
responsible for political, administrative, and regulatory work, have a cluster of public insti-
tutions that perform such delegated tasks as administration, provision of public services,
and commercial activities.
In sum, I hypothesize that government-sponsored indoctrination influences only those
students whose parents are government employees because they are predisposed to accept
government messages as a result of intergenerational transmission. Before testing this hy-
pothesis with a rigorous research design, I show supporting evidence to two observable
implications of my argument. The first observable implication is that government employ-
ees should possess more proregime attitudes than nonemployees. Using data from the
China Survey 2008, Appendix Section A presents the evidence that government employees
are significantly more inclined than nonemployees to trust government officials, feel satis-
fied with government performance, and feel pride in being Chinese, all things being equal.
The other observable implication is that affiliated students should have stronger political
attachment to the Party than nonaffiliated students. Focusing on CGSS respondents who
started high school around the curriculum reform years, results reported in Appendix Sec-
tion A show that affiliated students are significantly more likely than nonaffiliated students
to submit membership applications to the CCP, viewed as a display of proregime bias.
4This definition excludes personnel in themilitary and state-owned enterprises, a practice commonly adopted
in existing studies because they are managed differently from public bureaucracies.
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2.3 Empirical Strategy
To formally evaluate my hypothesis, I use variation in the content of political education
generated byChina’smost recent high school curriculum reform. I identify the causal effects
of political education in high school by comparing attitudes targeted in the new politics
textbooks of those who were just young enough to study the new textbooks and those who
were just too old to study them. One has no reason to suspect a substantial difference in
personal characteristics in these students after accounting for common characteristics of
province of origin and cohort. Thus, discontinuity in targeted attitudes between students
studying the old and new textbooks is likely caused by state indoctrination efforts.
2.3.1 Political Education in High Schools in China
China’s political education in high school is a canonical example of government-sponsored
indoctrination, where courses aim to "help students recognize correct values and grasp cor-
rect political direction."5 It is part of thought work in schools, aiming to shape the political
and social beliefs of students to promote their faith in the CCP leadership and socialist sys-
tem. Under the current Chinese educational system, high school students are required to
complete four political education courses in their first two years of high school, spending
two hours a week taking these courses. The four courses are Economic Life, Political Life,
Cultural Life, and Philosophy, each taughtwith a textbook bearing the name of the course as
its title and focusing on one specific topic. The order in which students register for the four
courses is not nationally uniform but depends on student choice or school circumstances. I
refer to these four textbooks as politics textbooks throughout the paper.
5This quotation is a translated excerpt from a government document: "Curriculum Framework for the Senior
High School Politics Subject." https://tinyurl.com/y6tcsa5n.
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2.3.2 The Eighth Curriculum Reform in China
The Eighth Curriculum Reform, the most recent one, was officially initiated after the
Ministry of Education issued its "Outline of Basic Education Curriculum Reform" in 2001.
According to this document, the primary goal of the reform is to facilitate the moral and
ideological education necessary in the current political, economic climate.6 The reformwas
described by government officials as "historically important" and one of themost significant
changes in educational policy since China’s economic reform in the late 1970s.
Between 2004 and 2010, the government implemented the curriculum reform, bringing
substantial changes in textbook content. Three features make the curriculum reform an ap-
pealing case to study the impact of state indoctrination. First, the initial cohort of students
studying the new curriculum would have an entirely different three-year curriculum from
those who started high school just a year earlier. This also means that the older, prereform
cohorts of students would not switch to study the new textbooks. This reform thus gen-
erates sharp variation in educational content offered to students who started high school
around the reform years.
Second, in contrast to educational reforms occurring at a "critical juncture," such as
regime change (e.g., from Weimar to Nazi Germany) and political crisis (e.g., after the
Tiananmen Incident), which often coincides with other socioeconomic changes that may
confound the effect of curriculum reform, the Eighth Curriculum Reform was not followed
by any major political changes in China. As a result the variation in educational content
used in the analysis enables me to isolate the impact of political education more cleanly.
Third, the Chinese government introduced the new curriculum to provinces during dif-
ferent years.7 This incremental approach creates two types of cross-sectional variations —
cross-cohort variation within provinces and cross-province variation within cohorts — that
6Available at http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2002/content_61386.htm.
7The introduction dates of the new curriculum were not randomly assigned across provinces. I address the
potential selection issue in the robustness check section.
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enable me to account for cohort-level and province-level differences that may confound the
impact of the curriculum change.
2.3.3 Changes in Textbook Content
A text analysis conducted by Cantoni et al. (2017) reveals that the old and new politics
textbooks maintain the same core content, but the new ones significantly shift content on
(1) Chinese political institutions, (2) Chinese economic institutions, (3) governance, (4)
ethnic identity, and (5) the environment. Given the data availability of the national survey
used in this study, my analysis focuses on the first three categories. I discuss each of them
below.
Chinese political institutions: the new textbooks emphasize teaching students about
socialist democracy, whose core element is political participation under the leadership of
the Party. The new politics textbooks encourage students to participate in "democratic elec-
tions," advocating that citizens exercise their voting rights when they have the opportunity.
In addition, the new textbooks intend to draw a line between orderly (i.e. institutional-
ized participation) and disorderly civil participation (i.e., unfettered political expression).
It notes that citizens’ political lives will become chaotic if they ignore the rules, regulations,
and procedures put in place by the government.
These changes in the content of Chinese political institutions correspond to the changes
in word frequency used in the new textbooks: Compared to the old textbooks, the term
participation is used 497%more often in the new textbooks. Even greater increases occurred
in the frequency of the use of democracy (2,057%) and elections (4,948%).
Chinese economic institutions: the new textbooks underscore the importance of so-
cialist market economy for economic and social development. In contrast to a free-market
economy, it highlights state intervention in the economy. Many newly added sections, such
as "Limitations of Market Allocation of Resources" and "Strengthening the State’s Macroe-
conomic Regulations and Controls," deliver the idea that markets are complemented or cor-
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rected by government regulation and state institutions. Notably, the new textbooks widely
uses everyday citizens’ personal economic behavior, such as buying goods and working
in labor units, as examples to elaborate why state intervention in citizens’ personal lives is
imperative for the socialist market economy.8 Consistent with these changes in textbook
content, the term government is mentioned 360% more times in the new textbooks than in
the old ones.
Governance: the new textbooks emphasize institutions that legitimize the Chinese gov-
ernment and its officials, especially adherence to the rule of law and administrative super-
vision. One of the main objectives of teaching students about the rule of law is to pro-
mulgate the virtue of "loving the CCP and the nation."9 Numerous added sections in the
new textbooks note that government officials exert their power and duties according to the
law, providing information about the methods by which citizens can supervise the govern-
ment’s power. Reflecting the revisions, the term legal institution is mentioned 497% more
frequently in the new textbooks than in the old textbooks.
The content changes reflect the objectives that the Chinese government outlined in cur-
riculum reform documents.10 The content shifts also are consistent with changes that the
Chinese governmentmade to the college entrance exam.11 Appendix Section B provides nu-
merous translated excerpts from the new politics textbooks to show how the new textbook
content related to the outcome of interest was presented under the new curriculum.
Based on changes in textbook content, I examine three political attitudes: views on state
intervention in citizen life, views ondemocracy, and trust in government officials. If political
education works as intended, people studying the new textbooks should be more inclined
8Scholars of China’s curriculum design have noted that a key feature distinguishing the new curriculum from
the old one is that the new politics textbooks use examples from citizens’ daily experience to increase the
relevance of the textbook materials in the eyes of students (Wang, 2008).
9This objective is noted in amemo by theMinistry of Education available at https://tinyurl.com/yavvosbk.
10Cantoni et al. (2017) in their text analysis show that the language used in a curriculum reform document
issued by China’s State Council is more prevalent in the new textbooks than in the old ones; the specific
terms related to the five categories identified show even sharper changes in prevalence across curricula.
11A full item-by-item discussion of each category of interest is presented in Appendix Section B.
14
than those studying the old textbooks to support state intervention in their personal lives
(politically and economically). They should also see people’s participation in elections as
the defining characteristic of democracy in a more affirmative manner. Finally, they should
have higher trust in government officials, who are described as adherents of the rule of law
and under administrative supervision.
2.3.4 Data and Variables
The data used in the analysis derive from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS), a
nationally representative survey run by the Renmin University in China. The CGSS, a part
of the International Social Survey Program, is regarded as one of the most professionally
managed surveys in China. I use all the available data from four independent waves of the
CGSS, one from each of the following years: 2010, 2012, 2013, and 2015.12
To implement the identification strategy I discuss below, I analyze only respondents
who fulfilled the following criteria. First, their highest level of education completed is at
least high school, which removes respondents not attending high school. Second, their
high school entry years were close to the years in which the new curriculum was intro-
duced. Third, they either never migrated to other provinces since birth or had migrated to
the province in which they currently live before age 15 (i.e., before students begin senior
high school). Because the CGSS does not ask where respondents attended high school, I
removed those whose migration histories I could not use to infer the places they attended
high school.
New Curriculum is the treatment, a binary variable coded as 1 if respondents studied the
new politics textbooks and 0 otherwise. Because CGSS does not ask respondents whether
they followed the new curriculum or not, I use respondents’ birth year to infer their treat-
12The analysis begins with the 2010 wave because it is the first round to include a meaningful number of
respondents studying the new curriculum. I drop the 2011 wave because it did not ask about the work units
of respondents’ parents; nor did it measure any outcome variables of interest. The 2014 wave has not been
released.
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ment conditions under the assumption that students start high school at age 15.13 I consider
respondents as "treated" if their high school entry year coincides with, or occurs after, the
introduction year of the new curriculum. By contrast, if respondents’ high school entry year
is prior to the introduction year, I consider them as "untreated." Among the 2,092 respon-
dents under analysis, 868 of themwere treated (41.49 %), and 1,224 of them (58.51 %) were
untreated by the new curriculum.
For the outcome variables, Interventionmeasures respondents’ attitudes toward state in-
tervention in citizen life. It aggregates three survey questions measured on a 5-point Likert
scale ranging from completely disagree to completely agree. Specifically, the CGSS asks
respondents how much they agree with the following statements:
• When an individual criticizes the government in public, the government should not
intervene.
• Howmany children people want to have is a personal matter; the government should
not intervene.
• People have the freedom to decide where to work and live; the government should
not intervene.
These items indicate different aspects of state intervention in citizen life, including people’s
political (the first item) and economic lives (the second and third item).14 Together, this
index provides a comprehensive indication of people’s general views on state intervention
13In the Chinese education system, high school or secondary education is intended for students aged 15 and
18. Granted, not every student starts high school at age 15, but because the CGSS does not ask respondents
when they started high school, this assumption is necessary for my analysis. I show in the robustness check
section that my results seem not sensitive to this assumption.
14The birth planning program and the household registration system in China are both important measures
that the government uses to serve its economic objectives and macroeconomic control. Thus, the second
and third questions are well-suited to measure attitudes toward the role of the government in the economy.
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in their personal lives.15
The next variable is Democracy, which measures respondents’ views on democracy. It is
operationalized using the following question: A political system can be considered a democracy
as long as citizens have the right to elect their representatives, who discuss critical national and
local issues on behalf of citizens. This variable is coded as 1 if respondents agreed with this
statement and 0 if not. The next variable is Trust, which measures respondents’ trust in
government officials on a 4-point Likert scale. It is operationalized using the following
question: To what extent do you trust local officials? I recode these variables in a way that a
higher valuemeans greater consistencywith the content of the new textbooks. I standardize
each outcome variable for ease of comparison.
Because the CGSSmay change questions across survey rounds, different rounds may be
used to test disparate outcome variables. Specifically, the Intervention questions were asked
in all four waves. The Democracy question was measured only in the 2013 wave. The Trust
question has fewer observations because only a subset of respondents in the 2012 wave was
asked the question.16
For affiliated students, I use the survey item asking the work units of respondents’ par-
ents when the respondents were 14. I define those whose parents (either or both of them)
had worked in the Party, the government, or public institutions as affiliated students. If
neither of their parents worked in those units, I define them as nonaffiliated students. No-
tably, people working in Party organs will count as public employees because the Chinese
bureaucracy has two parallel lines of authority: the Party and the government. In addition,
15The Cronbach’s alpha estimate is 0.477, which may be acceptable given the limited number of items. For
transparency, I report the results using the three items separately in Appendix Section C. Results do not
qualitatively change — the estimates are all in the right direction and follow a consistent pattern. I also
reestimate the baseline model by using principal component analysis and find that the results are robust.
16Appendix Section C provides the information about which questions were asked in each wave and the
associated number of observation. It also presents additional analyses regarding Intervention to address
the concern about changes in sampling across waves. For instance, I restrict each model to the smallest
number of observations across indicators in that wave. I also include survey year fixed effects in the model
to account for time-varying factors that may affect respondents differently across waves.
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public institutions in China can be fully or partially state funded or wholly self-funded; that
is, not all public employees in public institutions are on the official state payroll. I consider
working in the public institutions asworking for the government only if the units are at least
partially state funded. In total, 11.42% of the respondents are affiliated students. Among
these students’ parents, 10.67% worked in party-government organs and 89.32% in public
institutions. Table 2.1 presents summary statistics of the main variables.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Treated (New Curriculum=1) 0.415 0.493 0 1 2092
Affiliated Students (Yes=1) 0.114 0.318 0 1 2092
Intervention (Standardized) 0 1 -2.484 2.72 2075
Intervention (Unstandardized) 8.728 2.306 3 15 2075
Democracy (Standardized) 0 1 -2.18 0.458 536
Democracy (Unstandardized) 0.826 0.379 0 1 536
Trust (Standardized) 0 1 -1.807 1.986 275
Trust (Unstandardized) 2.429 0.791 1 4 275
Gender (Male=1) 0.496 0.5 0 1 2092
Ethnicity (Han=1) 0.940 0.238 0 1 2090
Height (in centimeters) 167.702 7.986 120 192 2090
Residence (Rural=1) 0.218 0.413 0 1 2092
Education 8.93 2.584 5 13 2086
Father in CCP 0.359 0.48 0 1 2071
Mother in CCP 0.297 0.457 0 1 2074
Father Education 4.989 2.31 1 13 2063
Mother Education 4.368 2.228 1 13 2061
Note: This table reports summary statistics of the key variables in this study. Data comes from the Chinese
General Social Survey.
The fact that respondents cannot preselect parents employed by the state lessens many
sorts of confounders that would affect their political predispositions. In addition, if I fol-
low a common practice used in prior studies that relies on survey items directly asking
respondents’ political predispositions, a concern is that people’s current attitudes almost
inevitably affect how they answer these questions. This issue is problematic when respon-
dents’ recall of predispositionswas influenced by their treatment conditions because having
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this variable in themodel raises red flags associatedwith posttreatment biases in what aims
to be a causal analysis. By contrast, 14-year-old respondents’ treatment conditions cannot
affect their parental occupations.
2.3.5 Identification Strategy
Using provincial variation in the curriculum reform and cohort variation in new cur-





p δp + β1New Curriculumcp + β2Affiliated Studentscp+
β3(New Curriculumcp × Affiliated Studentcp) + εicp,
(2.1)
where yicp is an individual survey question (i denotes the individual, c the high school en-
try cohort, and p the province of high school attendance). γc and δp are full sets of cohort
and province fixed effect. The coefficient β1 captures the treatment effect among nonaf-
filiated students, conditional on fixed differences across cohorts and provinces of origin.
The coefficient β2 captures the conditional expected values of y among affiliated students
who studied the old textbooks; β3 indicates by how much the effect of the new textbooks
changes when respondents are affiliated students. The error terms, εicp, are clustered at the
province×cohort level to account for correlated disturbances across individuals within a
province×cohort cell (the level at which the curriculum varies).
This model can then be used to calculate the marginal effect of the new textbooks on the
outcome variables of interest:
∂(Targeted Attitude)
∂(New Curriculum) = β1 + β3Affiliated Student (2.2)
Unlike in purely linear models, β1 has to be interpreted as a conditional coefficient repre-
senting the effect among nonaffiliated students (i.e., Affiliated Student =0). Conversely, the
sum of β1 and β3 captures the effect among affiliated students (i.e., Affiliated Student =1).
I use listwise deletion to address missing values because the magnitude of missingness is
small and will show that my results are robust to imputed data in the robustness check.
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To augment the causal inference, I focus on respondents whose high school entry year
occurred around the curriculum reform. In the analysis, all respondents come from four
cohorts of students who entered high school around the reform year from each side of the
curriculum.17 Table 2.2 describes the birth cohorts of students under analysis and their
treatment conditions. Granted, narrowing the bandwidth would avoid more potential bi-
ases from selection for treatment, yet because my main hypothesis involves two levels for
two factors (i.e., curriculum version and familial ties), narrower bandwidth will result in
fewer observations for each combination of the two factors. In the robustness check, I show
that the results are insensitive to bandwidth selection.
This identification strategy addresses various methodological concerns. First, province-
level differences could confound the influences of the new curriculum because they are
likely correlated with people’s attitudes. Pan and Xu (2017), for example, find that re-
gional economic composition, including trade openness and urbanization level, correlates
with Chinese citizens’ ideologies; however, these provincial differences cannot drive my re-
sults because I control for province fixed effects and exploit cross-cohort variation within
provinces.
Second, time-varying provincial heterogeneity could be another concern; for example,
differences in economic growth rates across provinces may differentially affect provinces
and thus bias the impact of the new curriculum. However, most province-specific, time-
varying factors seem unlikely to have very different effects across the neighboring cohorts
within a province because the cross-cohort variation exploited falls within a narrow win-
dow (i.e., peoplewho entered high school around the reformyear). In the robustness check,
I employ a tighter identification inwhich the interaction terms between province and cohort
17To illustrate, I use Shandong as an example. Because the new curriculum was introduced in 2004, the first
entry cohort of students receiving the new textbooks comprised those born in 1989, and the last entry cohort
of students receiving the old textbooks comprised those born in 1988. For Shandong, the analysis focuses
only on the cohorts of students born between 1985 and 1992, defining those born between 1985 and 1988 as
the control group (the last four prereform cohorts) and those born between 1989 and 1992 as the treatment
group (the first four postreform cohorts).
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Table 2.2: Reform Years Across Provinces and Cohorts Under Analysis
Years Provinces Under Reform Cohorts Analyzed
2004 Shandong, Ningxia, Hainan, Guangdong 1985-1988 (C)1989-1992 (T)
2005 Jiangsu 1986-1989 (C)1990-1993 (T)
2006 Tianjin, Zhejiang, Fujian, Anhui, Liaoning 1987-1990 (C)1991-1994 (T)
2007 Hunan, Jilin, Shaanxi, Heilongjiang, Beijing 1988-1991 (C)1992-1995 (T)
2008 Shanxi, Jiangxi, Henan, Xinjiang 1989-1992 (C)1993-1996 (T)
2009 Hebei, Hubei, Yunnan, Inner Mongol 1990-1993 (C)1994-1997 (T)
2010 Sichuan, Gansu, Guangxi, Qinghai, Tibet, Chongqing, Guizhou 1991-1994 (C)1995-1998 (T)
Note: Year refers to dates of introduction of the new textbooks. Provinces refer to the locations in which the
reformwas implemented. Cohorts Analyzed describes the treatment conditions of the birth cohorts analyzed,
with C denoting control group and T denoting treatment group.
fixed effects are included. Such model specification helps me to address the unobserved
province and cohort covarying characteristics.
Third, the natural evolution of attitudes across cohorts of students may explain attitudi-
nal differences between treated and untreated students even in the absence of the new text-
books. This concern, however, is alleviated by including cohort fixed effects in the model
that can zero out cross-cohort changes in attitudes. Fourth, one could argue that the curricu-
lum reformmight accompany other policies introduced to a reformed province; the policies
could bias the results if they differentially affected the treated and untreated respondents.
I consulted newspapers and no such policy exists.
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2.4 Results
I first show that respondents under analysis who followed the old and new textbooks
are statistically indistinguishable. Because respondents studying the new textbooks are
younger and come from provinces where the new curriculum was introduced earlier, I in-
clude province and cohort fixed effects in the balance check to account for common charac-
teristics in the province of origin and average characteristics of a cohort. Figure 2.1 shows
that the treated and untreated respondents are similar in a battery of personal characteris-
tics. Appendix Section D reports the full estimates.
Figure 2.1: Balance Test
Note: This coefficient plot shows the OLS estimates of personal characteristics on exposure to the new cur-
riculum. The dots represent the regression coefficients and the bars 95% confidence intervals. All regressions
include a full set of province and cohort fixed effects. N=2026.
The main result supports my argument that the effectiveness of state indoctrination is
conditional. Figure 2.2 reports the estimated marginal treatment effects for affiliated and
nonaffiliated students with corresponding confidence intervals. It shows that the new text-
books successfully affected only affiliated students. Compared to the untreated affiliated
students, affiliated students exposed to the new textbooks exhibit more positive attitudes
toward government intervention in citizen life (p ≤ 0.05), view participation in elections
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as a defining characteristic of democracy (p ≤ 0.05), and feel greater trust in local officials
(p ≤ 0.1). By contrast, the new textbooks did not affect nonaffiliated students in the same
manner. Among these students, those studying the new textbooks seem indistinguishable
across the three political attitudes that the government aimed to change from those study-
ing the old textbooks. Some coefficients even have awrong sign: the estimates forDemocracy
and Trust are negative, although they are not statistically significant.
Figure 2.2: Marginal Effects of the New Textbooks
Note: This plot shows the effects of the new textbooks on the targeted attitudes by affiliation status. The bullet
symbols represent the standardized coefficients and the bars 95% (90%) confidence intervals. All regression
coefficients account for province and cohort fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the province ×
cohort level. N=2075 (Intervention); N=536 (Democracy); N=275 (Trust)
Moreover, the estimates of the interaction variable are statistically significant at the .1
level, meaning that the treatment effects on affiliated students seem larger than those on
nonaffiliated students (see Appendix Section D). Note that my argument about the condi-
tional indoctrination does not necessarily mean that the new textbooks had larger effects on
affiliated students than on nonaffiliated students, yet such evidence bolsters my argument
that the effectiveness of state indoctrination depends on receivers’ familial connections to
the regime.
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One should also expect that the overall effects of the new textbooks are indiscernible be-
cause the vast majority of the respondents analyzed in this paper are nonaffiliated students.
This expectation is consistent with Huang (2015a), who finds that political education in
Chinese colleges does not indoctrinate students. To test this claim, I remove the condition-
ing variable and the interaction term from the baseline model, which allowsme to interpret
the regression coefficients associated withNew Curriculum as the average effects of the new
textbooks on students’ attitudes.
The OLS estimates in Figure 2.3 support my expectation, showing that overall the new
textbooks had no demonstrable effect on people’s political attitudes. In addition, the coef-
ficient signs are unstable: although the estimate for Intervention and Trust is positive, it is
negative forDemocracy. In short, I find that the new textbooks did not persuade themajority
of people in a manipulative fashion, casting doubt on the actual degree to which the Chi-
nese regime can change minds by changing school content. Appendix Section D presents
the full estimates.
Figure 2.3: Average Treatment Effects
Note: This plot shows the estimated effects of the new textbooks using the pooled sample. The bullet symbols
represent the standardized coefficients and the bars 95% (90%) confidence intervals. All coefficients are OLS
estimates and account for province and cohort fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the province ×
cohort level. N=2075 (Intervention); N=536 (Democracy); N=275 (Trust)
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My finding that indoctrination works only for children of regime stakeholders is not
trivial. One might contend that these students may have been fairly aligned with the gov-
ernment in attitudes that the Chinese authorities attempt to change, so making them more
aligned with the government seems unimportant; yet the data shows that the untreated
affiliated students have significantly lower scores on the three targeted attitudes than the
untreated nonaffiliated students (not reported). The benchmark differences indicate that
my results are consequential.
2.4.1 Falsification Tests
To corroborate the treatment effect identification, I conduct two falsification tests. First,
I reanalyze the data using attitudes not targeted in the new textbooks. Because the placebo
attitudes were not what the new textbooks aimed to change, one should observe no effect.
I select five attitudes related to trust (ordinary people, relatives, neighbors, bank staff, and
journalists). Panel (a) in Figure 2.4 shows that the new textbooks had no impact on the
placebo attitudes, even among the affiliated student sample where I find indoctrination
works. Second, I reanalyze the data bymoving the introduction dates of the new curriculum
three years before its actual dates. That is, the last three cohorts of students studying the
old textbooks in real life are considered here as the first three cohorts studying the new
textbooks. Under the placebo reform years, none of the cohorts of students analyzed was
exposed to the new textbooks, so no effect should occur. Panel (b) in Figure 2.4 shows that
the effects identified previously disappear in the falsification test.
2.4.2 Robustness Check
I conduct seven sets of additional analysis to show that my results are robust.18 First, I
examine whether the results are sensitive to the assumption that students start high school
at age 15. Second, I address the concern that parental occupation is endogenous. Third,
18In Appendix Section E, I use tables to report the full results based on the baselinemodel and coefficient plots
to show the marginal treatment effects by affiliation status.
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Figure 2.4: Falsification Tests
(a) Placebo Attitudes (b) Placebo Reform
Note: Panel (a) shows the effects of the new textbooks on nontargeted attitudes. Panel (b) presents the effects
of the new textbooks using placebo reform. The bullet symbols represent the standardized coefficients and the
bars 95% (90%) confidence intervals. All regression coefficients are OLS estimates and account for province
and cohort fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the province × cohort level. Appendix Section D
reports the regression coefficients.
I reanalyze the data by controlling for individual-level covariates. Fourth, I address the
concern that the introduction dates of the new curriculum were not randomized across
provinces. Fifth, I reanalyze the data by taking province-specific, cross-cohort trends into
account. Sixth, I use a more demanding model to address the unobservable province and
cohort covarying characteristics that could bias the results. Seventh, I reanalyze the data us-
ing multiple imputed data for missing values. Appendix Section E discusses these analyses
in more detail and reports the results.
2.5 Alternative Explanations
I discuss four alternative explanations of the effects. First, affiliated students may tend
to falsify their preferences (Jiang and Yang, 2016; Truex and Tavana, 2019): they may be
more likely than nonaffiliated students to express politically correct views as suggested by
the new textbooks. If so, the effects are detected even when affiliated students are not truly
indoctrinated by the textbooks’ content. Second, affiliated students may pay better atten-
tion to political education or are more academically competent than nonaffiliated students.
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The effects may thus reflect the fact that they memorize lines from the content of the new
textbooks better rather than believe it.
Third, a complementarity may exist between family influence and school education: the
new textbooks alone may not be able to affect affiliated students unless the textbooks’ con-
tent is complemented by family influence. For example, state-related parents may discuss
with their children the exact same lessons the new textbooks purposely emphasized, “teach-
ing” the textbook content outside the classroom. The content of the new textbooks is rein-
forced by such family influence to indoctrinate affiliated students.19 Fourth, the introduc-
tion of the new curriculum was likely accompanied by better educational resources allo-
cated to students, such as improved textbook quality, teaching practice, and school spend-
ing. Consistent with the results, the textbook effects can be conditional on predispositions
because affiliated students may respond more positively than nonaffiliated ones to govern-
ment actions that benefit them. If so, the effects may reflect changes in educational quality
rather than changes in educational content.
The first three alternative explanations put a slightly different spin on the interpretations
of the effects but may not change the treatment effect identification per se. By contrast, if the
fourth alternative explanation is true, my estimates could be biased because it suggests that
a confounder (i.e., educational quality), rather than the claimed treatment (i.e., educational
content), causedmy results. Two analyses show that this alternative explanation is unlikely
to explain my finding.
I first reanalyze the data by controlling for provincial spending on secondary education
at the province-cohort level (calculated as a province’s average level of spending during
the three years of senior high school for each cohort). Figure 2.5 shows that the estimates
19Although I cannot rule out this explanation directly, I have suggestive evidence to refute another related
claim: affiliated studentsmay have been affected by the new curriculum in the family before they attend high
school and thus the results may be better interpreted as the effects of "new curriculum parents," not the new
curriculum per se; yet if the effects are based on prehigh school indoctrination, affiliated and nonaffiliated
respondents who did not attend high school around the curriculum reform years should express different
targeted attitudes. Results reported in Table A.15 do not support this conjecture.
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controlling for school spending are nearly identical to the baseline results. Even if school
spendingmayhave been greater for the cohorts in provinces exposed to the newcurriculum,
better educational quality accompanying the curriculum reform does not drive the result.
Figure 2.5: Marginal Effects of the New Textbooks Controlling for Spending on Secondary
Education at the province × cohort level
Note: The bullet symbols represent the standardized coefficients and the bars 95% (90%) confidence intervals.
All regression coefficients include a full set of province and cohort fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the province × cohort level.
To complement the quantitative evidence, I also conducted semistructured interviews
with high school teachers and graduates from Beijing, Fujian, and Sichuan in China. My
interviews reveal that students always get brand new textbooks each year even in the old
design. This is true in all urban and rural areas; the only exception is perhaps extremely
poor regions. In other words, textbooks in the old design do not mean that they are dilap-
idated books; nor did the teachers think teaching practices were substantially changed as
a result of the reform because teachers’ and students’ incentives were still directed toward
the memorization of textbook content to succeed in the college entrance exam. This view
concurswith observations frommanyChinese scholars of curriculumdesign and public ed-
ucation (Guo, 2010; Mao, 2018). The qualitative evidence could alleviate the concern that
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improved textbook quality and teaching practice may confound the effect of the curriculum
change.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper finds consistent evidence that the new politics textbooksworked only among
respondents whose parents had been employed by the government. By contrast, the same
state indoctrination effort had no discernible impact on the vast majority of the respon-
dents.20 In light of the findings of Cantoni et al. (2017) that the new politics textbooks were
successful in shifting people’s political attitudes in an intended direction, the results of this
paper seem to disagree.
My results, however, are fairly compatible with theirs once taking their survey respon-
dents’ family backgrounds into consideration. Their student sample comes from Peking
University (PKU), in which the most common occupation type among the students’ par-
ents since 1997 is cadres (ganbu) in party-government organs and public institutions (Liang
and Lee, 2012).21 Because many parents of PKU students have close ties to state patronage,
their sample seems likely to show the effect of the new textbooks. My finding not only cor-
roborates their study but also casts doubt on the degree to which the Chinese government
can change minds by changing school textbooks on a large scale.
Besides the different sample adopted, two main differences between this study and that
of Cantoni et al. (2017) may explain why I find no effect on the general population. The
first pertains to the difference in reform years covered: Cantoni et al. (2017) look only at
students from provinces where the reform occurred in 2007, 2008, and 2009 because they
20The null effectmay be a surprise because the Chinese government owns amassive institutional structure and
resources for propaganda provision (Brady, 2009; Shambaugh, 2007). Besides, propaganda should readily
work because most Chinese citizens have comparatively limited access to competing messages (Stockmann
and Gallagher, 2011). Finally, when the respondents were exposed to political education, they were in their
formative years.
21According to their data, 39.76% of PKU students’ parents from 1995-1999 were cadres in party-government
organs and public institutions. Only 1.7% of the Chinese populationwere cadres in these work units in 2000.
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surveyed only students in college. This paper, by contrast, covers the entire time period of
the reform. If provinces that introduced the new curriculum later did better in the imple-
mentation of the reform because they learned from the provinces that implemented earlier,
Cantoni et al. (2017) may have much leverage to find the effect. I reanalyze the data with
only these latecomer provinces but still find no effect on the general population. The second
reason relates to the duration of effects: because Cantoni et al. (2017) surveyed only college
students, the case could be made that an effect for respondents in college indeed exists and
that the effect decreases over time for those out of college for longer periods of time. Given
the data at hand, I cannot evaluate this hypothesis. The only statement I can make is that
the effect on those who have familial ties to the regime seems lasting over time.22
One limitation of this paper is that the CGSS does not include items measuring respon-
dents’ family dynamics that would affect transmission rates. According to the extant lit-
erature, the transmission of political predispositions from parents to children is higher in
families where political discussion among family members is frequent (family politiciza-
tion). Parent-to-child transmission rates are also higher when the family forms a collective
body, not a mere assemblage of fortuitously related individuals (unity). This paper is fo-
cused primarily on the direction of political attachments (i.e., attached to the CCP), but the
intensity of political attachments resulting from family politicization and unity could also
be relevant. I leave this empirical inquiry to future researchers.
Despite limitations, this paper contributes to existing scholarship in three chief ways.
First, my finding is not only consistent with new studies showing that hard propaganda
has a limited effect on attitudes (Bush et al., 2016; Huang, 2015a, 2018; Selb and Munz-
ert, 2018) but sheds light on what segment of the population on which propaganda works
22This claim is based on the fact that many respondents in this study have graduated from college. I further
explore this issue by focusing on the early cohorts studying the new textbooks. Results based on the sample
with cohorts just one year above and below the reform year show that the effects are still discernible among
the affiliated students who constitute the earliest cohort in their province to study the new curriculum. This
is stronger evidence of the duration of treatment effect. Appendix Section E report the results.
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best. Second, my finding highlights the importance of people’s familial ties to the regime in
moderating their responses to propaganda, suggesting that the political contexts in which
people were socialized may affect their receptivity to propaganda. Future research can ex-
amine the micro-level mechanisms underlying the results.
Finally, myfinding suggests an alternative account for reasons that authoritarian govern-
ments still engage in propaganda when most citizens seem not to believe it. The prevailing
view is that propaganda signals government strength in maintaining social control and po-
litical order (Huang, 2015a; Wedeen, 1999). I add that political elites invest resources in
state indoctrination because it could reinforce existing believers. This claim also speaks to
a new body of research on the presence of propaganda as a strategy of control (Chen and
Xu, 2015; Guriev and Treisman, 2015). My finding implies that state indoctrination could
make a regime durable not because it expands the popular base of the regime but because
it consolidates those already aligned with the government.
31
Chapter 3
How the Pro-Beijing Media Influences Voters: A Field
Experiment
3.1 Introduction
Overseas media operations are ubiquitous. In both democracies and autocracies, many
governments have devoted considerable resources and efforts to influencing the public out-
side their borders. Prior studies focus mainly on the political impact of foreign media in
autocracies (Crabtree, Darmofal and Kern, 2015; Crabtree, Kern and Pfaff, 2018; Kern, 2011;
Kern and Hainmueller, 2009; Krugler, 2000). Some recent work has investigated foreign
media’s cross-border effects on democratic elections (DellaVigna et al., 2014; Peisakhin and
Rozenas, 2018). Yet, no media influence receives more attention today than the overseas
media operations deployed by powerful autocratic countries like China and Russia (Chap-
man and Gerber, 2019; DiResta et al., 2020; Fisher, 2020; McCabe, 2020).
China views political persuasion and information management as a top government
priority (Brady, 2009). In recent years the country has engaged in global information cam-
paigns to promote the country’s positive image and political agenda. China’s overseas me-
dia operations take various forms, including coopting foreignmedia outlets (Dai andLuqiu,
2020; Hamilton, 2018; Hsu, 2014; Sciutto, 1996), expanding its state-ownedmedia networks
(Bailard, 2016; Gorfinkel et al., 2014; Wasserman and Madrid-Morales, 2018), and using
social media (Min and Luqiu, 2020) to disseminate Beijing’s preferred messages abroad.
As for China’s global information campaigns, Taiwan is an important target. From its
inception in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has claimed the island is part of
China’s sovereign territory. To deter Taiwan from pursuing independence, China has in-
vested heavily in Taiwan’s media outlets to influence news coverage on the island (Hsu,
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2014; Huang, 2017). Reports show that China has given a Taiwan media outlet, The China
Times, editorial instructions on how China–Taiwan issues should be covered (Aspinwall,
2019; Hille, 2019; Hsu, 2014). The CCP also provides funds to media outlets that adopt a
pro-Beijing line in their reports (Huang, 2019b; Lee and Cheng, 2019). China’s involvement
in Taiwan’smediamarket has led tomass protests against "redmedia," that is, Taiwan-based
media that actively fall in line with Beijing’s interest.
Concerns about China’s interference in elections through friendly media have become
salient in recent years, but the effectiveness of pro-Beijing media in affecting voters remains
unknown because there is little well-identified evidence. The effect of exposure to pro-
Beijing media is not a priori obvious. Some writers have claimed that increasing access
to China-friendly information will sway receivers in China’s desirable direction (Huang,
2019c). Previous studies also suggest that most media consumers do not discount media
bias strongly enough and are thus subject to persuasion upon exposure (Cain, Loewenstein
and Moore, 2005). By contrast the impact of pro-Beijing media could be trivial because
people may be certain about the bias of the media and thus exposure will have no effect on
beliefs and voting (Durante and Knight, 2012). The limited impact of the political media
may be particularly true in democracies in which media consumers exercise greater choice
over bothmedia content and sources (Arceneaux and Johnson, 2013). Still others argue that
increasing the supply of such media messages among voters will not lead to a greater con-
vergence of beliefs: the study of confirmatory bias shows that giving additional information
to people with different prior opinions can lead to divergence rather than convergence of
beliefs (Levendusky, 2013).
Identifying the effect of pro-Beijing media on individuals’ voting behavior and political
attitudes is challenging. Most studies of the effects of the media are limited by their de-
pendence on survey methods and observational data. In this tradition the standard test for
media effects is the difference in outcomes for individuals who report high levels of media
exposure and those who report low levels. This design has two major problems. First, peo-
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ple’s political media use is often endogenous to their political preferences (Bartels, 1993;
Stroud, 2008): those who choose to tune in to pro-Beijing media may differ systematically
in ways that matter to their vote choices and opinions about China from those who do
not. This selection issue vitiates the ability to disentangle cause from effect. Despite re-
cent advances in the design of observational studies (DellaVigna et al., 2014; Peisakhin and
Rozenas, 2018), they cannot identify the causal impact ofmedia communicationwithout in-
voking assumptions about the unobservables. Second, relying on self-reported media use
and news consumption can lead to biased conclusions due to faulty recall, social desirability
concerns, and other sources of misreporting (Prior, 2013; Guess, 2015).
To address the methodological hurdles, I use a field experiment that randomly assigns
study participants to receive real-time political news coverage from The China Times.1 I
present the news coverage on a website and incentivize participants to browse the web-
site in the weeks leading up to the 2020 Taiwanese presidential election. To probe whether
and howmuch participants consume news coverage from the website, I use web traffic data
to track their browsing behavior on thewebsite. Compared to self-reports, the tracking data
provides much more accurate information on individuals’ exposure patterns.
A panel survey was conducted to measure people’s voting decisions and attitudes to-
ward China before and after the experiment. I fielded a baseline survey four weeks prior
to the election, giving random participants access to the news website. After the election, I
recontacted all participants for an endline survey. By combining the survey data and track-
ing data, I examine the individual-level changes in outcome scores as a result of exposure
to the pro-Beijing news. The survey also contains a rich set of participants’ background
characteristics, allowing me to evaluate effect heterogeneity.
Results show that pro-Beijing news has a direct impact on people’s candidate choices.
Those who are randomly assigned to receive the news website become more likely to vote
1I preregistered this experiment with EGAP (ID 20191221AA) and obtained approval from the IRB of the
University of Texas at Austin under protocol 2019-09-017.
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for China’s preferred presidential candidate. In substantive terms, exposure to the news
coverage moves from 15.9 to 26.8 percent (depending on the definition of compliance) of
voters who were not already persuaded to choose China’s preferred candidate on election
day. Importantly, the effects are realizedmainly by persuading undecided voters and bring-
ing partisans home rather than by turning voters away from their initial vote intention.
The same political stimulus has differential effects on voters with opposing political pri-
ors. Although the pro-Beijing media in this study on average had an intended effect on
voters’ favorability toward China and its preferred candidate, these results are predomi-
nantly driven by people who are predisposed to accept China-friendly messages and those
who are nonpartisans. By contrast the same pro-Beijing news had a negligible, even back-
fire, effect among those who had been more China-skeptical ex ante and those who think
the pro-Beijing media outlet in this study is connected with the Chinese government.
More evidence suggests that the results work through persuasion: the treatment effects
are significantly larger among voters who are less attentive to the 2020 election in the base-
line survey and those who think the pro-Beijing media outlet is a credible news source.
These results are consistent with models in which people with lower stored information
are more susceptible to media messages (Zaller, 1992). They also align with studies show-
ing that persuasive messages work best when their perceived credibility is high (Lupia and
McCubbins, 1998). I further evaluate why the pro-Beijing media influences voters, finding
that pro-Beijing news triggers people’s cognitive and emotional reactions in the direction
consistent with the way the treatment changes their behavior and attitudes. A placebo test
confirms the findings.
This paper offers two main contributions. First, it is the earliest investigation that ana-
lyzes the effectiveness of China’s overseas influence operations in swaying voters. My field
experiment provides evidence that a main pro-Beijing media outlet successfully affects the
public outside mainland China in Beijing’s favor. Second, this paper presents and imple-
ments a new approach to documenting politicalmedia effects in real-world settings through
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the combination of field experiment and observed behavior of media consumption.
My study differs from those exploring media effects in laboratories (Benedictis-Kessner
et al., 2019; Levendusky, 2013); it also differs from studies examining only attitudes (Arce-
neaux and Johnson, 2013; Benedictis-Kessner et al., 2019; Bleck andMichelitch, 2017; Druck-
man, Peterson and Slothuus, 2013). Even if some scholars examine voting behavior, their
analyses are based on either aggregate data (Adena et al., 2015; DellaVigna and Kaplan,
2007; DellaVigna et al., 2014; Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017) or self-reported media exposure
(Peisakhin and Rozenas, 2018; Gerber, Karlan and Bergan, 2009). In contrast to these stud-
ies, in the current study I use individual-level data with information on individuals’ media
consumption behavior in real-world settings.
The findings of this paper have important implications for current events regarding not
only the general issue of foreign interference in democratic elections but also the rise of
China and its influence on neighboring countries—perhaps even its global reach.
3.2 Theoretical Expectations
Citizens learn about politics and government from mass media (Graber and Dunaway,
2017; Paletz, 2002). The role of the media is most evident at election times, when the media
are the primary conduits of information between candidates and voters. Because few peo-
ple attend rallies or have direct contact with the candidates or their representatives, most
voters have incomplete information about candidate quality and policy positions. The me-
dia thus provide the bulk of information voters can use in elections. Voters form or update
their evaluations of candidates through media-based information (Dalton, Beck and Huck-
feldt, 1998; Gelman and King, 1993; Kahn and Kenney, 2002).
Consistent with these arguments, recent empirical work provides evidence of media
effects on voters’ evaluation and choice of candidates (Adena et al., 2015; DellaVigna and
Kaplan, 2007; Druckman and Parkin, 2005; Huber and Arceneaux, 2007; Ladd and Lenz,
2009; Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017; Murphy and Devine, 2018). These studies align with
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some early work (Barker, 1999; Bartels, 1993; Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Zaller, 1996) in the
sense that they posit that the media have a direct influence on the public by reinforcing
people’s existing opinions or persuading them to support particular candidates or political
parties.
I argue that pro-Beijing media affect behavior because they change receivers’ opinions.
Because pro-Beijing media messages are slanted in favor of China and its preferred candi-
date, individuals receiving such information over timewould becomemore positive toward
China and its preferred candidate, which in turn should increase their likelihood of choos-
ing the favored candidate. Thus, the first hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (direct media influence): On average, pro-Beijingmediamessageswill nudge peo-
ple to vote for China’s preferred presidential candidate and adopt more favorable attitudes toward
China.
This line of reasoning contains three testable hypotheses. First, the effects of pro-Beijing
media should be greater among voters who are less attentive to politics ex ante. Persuasion
tends to be more effective when receivers have less information. The weaker the receivers’
priors, the more new information affects their beliefs. By contrast behavior will be less elas-
tic when receivers are close to certain about the state ex ante (DellaVigna and Gentzkow,
2010). Research on campaign persuasion has shown that voters will discount new infor-
mation relative to their existing stories of politically relevant information. Studies have also
found that highly informed citizens aremore resistant to changing their political views after
exposure to state propaganda (Geddes and Zaller, 1989; Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011).
In short, the lower this inertia resistance, the greater the susceptibility of voters to alter their
beliefs in the face of persuasion (Zaller, 1992). This leads me to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (political attentiveness): The effects of pro-Beijing media will be greater among
voters who are less attentive to politics before exposure to pro-Beijing media messages.
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Additionally, the pro-Beijingmedia should bemore effective in shifting behaviors among
voters who think the information is credible because people’s inferences from a given mes-
sage will depend on what they know about the credibility of the message source (Chaiken
and Maheswaran, 1994; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Pornpitakpan, 2004). Previous stud-
ies have shown that people confronted with information from a source known to be biased
would account for this bias in their learning (Chiang and Knight, 2011). The third hypoth-
esis is thus as follows:
Hypothesis 3 (source credibility): The pro-Beijingmedia effects will bemore pronounced among
voters who think the pro-Beijing media provides credible information.
Furthermore, every opinion is a marriage of information and predispositions (Zaller,
1992), and thus pro-Beijing media could differentially influence people with opposing pre-
existing political preferences. When processing new information on hot cognition issues
(e.g., politics), people are often motivated to uphold their prior beliefs (Kunda, 1990; Taber
and Lodge, 2006), making them easily assimilate information congruent with their pri-
ors but discount, even counterargue, information that challenges their priors (Ditto and
F. Lopez, 1992; Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979; Taber and Lodge, 2006). As a result expo-
sure to the same political information may not converge but instead alter people’s beliefs
in differential directions because they learn from the information differently in accordance
with their political predispositions. Like other political media programs (e.g., Levendusky,
2013), the pro-Beijing media could trigger and intensify such biased reasoning because of
the media outlet’s slanted presentation of the news and its one-sided messages.
In particular, pro-Beijing media may have backfire effects among voters who are dismis-
sive of China ex ante. Taber and Lodge (2006) andRedlawsk (2002) interpret backfire effects
as a possible result of the process by which people counterargue preference–incongruent
information and bolster their preexisting views. If people counterargue unwelcome infor-
mation vigorously enough, they may report opinions that are more extreme than they oth-
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erwise would have had. Some recent studies show evidence of backfire effects (e.g., Adena
et al., 2015; Bail et al., 2018; Levendusky, 2013; Nyhan and Reifler, 2010); yet others yield
opposite results (Guess and Coppock, 2018). Together, this leads to my fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 (prior political preferences): The pro-Beijingmediawill have positive effects among
voters who are predisposed to be China-friendly but will have negative effects among those who are
China-skeptical ex ante.
3.3 Political Landscape in Taiwan
Taiwan was an authoritarian regime from the time the Kuomintang (KMT) arrived on
the island from mainland China in 1949 until its loss of the presidency in 2000. Through
the enforcement of martial law and political machine, the KMT kept a powerful hold on the
state and throughout the Cold War (Rigger, 2000). National elections were suspended in
the name of national emergency arising from the confrontationwith theCCP.Anyperceived
opposition to the KMT was considered illegal and repressed. The opponents operated un-
der the informal rubric of "dangwai," or outside the party. In 1986, dangwai politicians
founded the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Although this move technically violated
martial law, the event went unpunished, and only ten months later, the KMT terminated
martial law and allowed opposition parties to emerge (Fan and Feigert, 1988; Chao and
Myers, 1998). Taiwan’s national legislative bodies were under complete reelection in 1992
and its first direct presidential election was held in 1996. The DPP’s electoral performance
between 1986 and 2000, however, was stagnant because the KMT still preserved a large
popular base and resource advantage (Greene, 2007; Rigger, 2000). The DPP won the pres-
idency thanks to a divided KMT in the 2000 election, ending more than half a century of
KMT rule on Taiwan.
The dominant cleavage in Taiwan’s presidential elections is organized around policy
on Beijing. Accordingly, the political scene is divided into two camps (Schubert, 2004).
Led by the KMT, the pan-Blue camp is friendlier to Beijing and believe that expanding
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economic ties with China is important for Taiwan’s continued economic dynamism. The
pan-Green camp led by the DPP, by contrast, argues that increasing these ties threatens na-
tional sovereignty and security. The pan-Green camp thus adopts a more skeptical stance
toward Beijing and advocates a Taiwanese national identity distinctive from the mainland.
Relations with China dominate Taiwan’s domestic political discourse and form the main
political and social cleavage separating the two major parties (Clark and Tan, 2012).
Despite the differences, a majority of Taiwan’s voters evades directly factoring in the
choice of unification or independence, at least not immediately. Most voters consider an
open-ended future of the relationship with the mainland as the best option of Taiwan,
which can own the benefits of de facto independence (economic freedom and democratic
self-government) without the risk of de jure independence (Chu, 2004; Rigger, 2001). Con-
sequently, both political camps state a desire to maintain the status quo. According to Tai-
wan’s Election and Democratization Study, a continual large-scale survey research project,
the share of independent voters in the population has steadily increased since 2011; in 2019,
around 40% of voters are self-identified as nonpartisans, who tend to exhibit amoderate po-
sition on various issues germane to China-Taiwan relations (Wang, 2019).
The 2020 presidential election took place on January 11 to elect the president and all
members of the legislature. The election had a turnout of 74.9%, up from 66% four years
earlier and the highest among nationwide elections since 2008. Three major presidential
candidates ran in the election: Tsai Ing-Wen of the DPP, whowas elected in 2016 and sought
a second term; Han Kuo-yu of the KMT, who was elected Mayor of Kaohsiung in 2018; and
James Soong, who is the chairman of a third-party in the Blue camp. Tsai won the election
with 57.13% of vote share. Han was the runner up with 38.6% of vote share; Soong came
third with 4.26% of the vote.2
2Given that the election was not a close one, this study was unlikely to affect the election outcome and thus
I had no ethical concern. Besides, I show in a following section that the study did not decrease turnout,
a practice deemed essential for any well-functioning democracy. The finding eases the concern that my
experiment may demobilize people to vote.
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3.4 Experimental Design
The experimental design is summarized in Figure 3.1. Prior to treatment assignment,
I identify in a baseline survey conducted four weeks before the election those study par-
ticipants who are already existing China Times (CT) consumers.3 I exclude these exist-
ing consumers in the subsequent treatment assignment but follow them throughout the
study because they serve as benchmarks to interpret the treatment effects.4 The existing
consumers receive the same survey questionnaire as those who are not existing consumers.
Next, I randomly assign the remaining participants to one of the three groups: (1) treat-
ment group, members of which receive access to a website containing real political news
from The China Times; (2) placebo group, in which people receive access to another website
containing real entertainment news from The China Times; and (3) control group, in which
people are subject to the media environment as in the status quo (i.e., receive no website;
no exogenous source of news). I conduct the treatment assignment upon the completion of
the baseline survey.
Participants have website access during the two weeks leading up to the election (i.e.,
from December 28, 2019, to January 11, 2020). On December 28, 2019, participants receive
my first email about the website.5 I incentivize participants to visit a website containing
important daily news (see B.1 for a screenshot of the invitation email in Online Appendix).
Participants are told that they will receive NT$150.00 (equivalent to $5.00) if they spend an
average of three minutes per day browsing the website in the days leading up to January
11, 2020. I attach a user-specific hyperlink to the email for participants to access the website.
3I identify existing China Times consumers by using a survey question asking respondents whether they read
any of Taiwan’s four largest newspapers in Taiwan on a nearly daily basis. If participants answer no, they are
in the experimental sample. If they answer yes, I ask them which newspaper(s) they read regularly. Those
whose responses do not include China Times are in the experimental sample; those whose responses include
China Times are not, and I call these participants existing consumers throughout the paper.
4I am cautious about using existing consumers as benchmarks to interpret the treatment effects because I do
not measure their news consumption and so have no precise information on whether and how often they
read The China Times.
5A screenshot of the email can be seen in Figure B.1
41
Figure 3.1: Overview of Experimental Design
The customized URLs not only ensure that people can access the website only through the
hyperlink but also help me to identify each participant’s browsing activity on the website.
In the following days, I send daily reminders to participants about the website. I disable
the website link after the election and launch an endline survey the next day.
I note three points: first, I do not tell participants that they are randomly assigned to
receive the website access; that is, they do not know their treatment conditions, thus no
performance bias.6 Second, the experiment does not force participants to browse the web-
site content but allows them to decide whether and how much they want to do so, which
is more natural and closer to people’s media consumption behavior. Third, I choose to
6Guarding against “demand effects”—cues in the setting that suggest to experimental participants what is
expected of them—is important for experiments (Mummolo and Peterson, 2019). To limit the impact of
demand effects, I undertake two precautions. First, instead of telling participants that this study is about the
pro-Beijing media, they are told that the study is about voters’ opinions about political and societal affairs.
This description could discourage participants from wondering what I intended to do. Second, I do not
inform participants that they are randomly assigned to receive website access, preventing such information
from affecting the behavior and attitudes of interest.
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present the pro-Beijing news in the form of online newspapers instead of print ones for the
following reasons: In Taiwan, more people acquire news from the Internet over time.7 The
Internet has become a major source of political news for citizens, second only to television.8
In addition, using a tailored website allows me to measure individuals’ media exposure
in a more precise and unobtrusive fashion; for example, I can measure whether (and how
much) people are actually treated. Gerber, Karlan and Bergan (2009) distribute their treat-
ment in the form of newspaper subscriptions, admitting that they cannot be sure that the
newspapers were read after people received them. Although survey-based measures of
media consumption are widely used in previous studies, they are plagued with questions
about validity (Guess, 2015; Prior, 2013).9
The Pro-Beijing News Website Over the course of the experiment, I update the website
on a daily basis with real-time news articles from The China Times. I standardize the way to
choose news articles. First, I select all news stories from the front page of The China Times.10
Second, I select all China-related news stories from the cross-strait-relations page of The
China Times.
When participants click the hyperlink provided in the emails, they are redirected to the
website’s homepage. Participants can click date icons on the homepage to access the news
articles for a given publication date. For example, by clicking the date icon 2020-01-01,
participants will enter a new webpage containing the news articles published on that date.
7The Taiwan Communication Survey, a national survey, asks respondents to report their frequency of acquir-
ing online news on a 4-point scale (never, seldom, sometimes, and often). In the 2003 wave, 26.5% reported
that they often or sometimes do so; in the latest 2015 wave, the number increases to 74.2%.
8In the latest 2015 Taiwan Communication Survey, 75.1% of respondents often or sometimes acquire polit-
ical news from TV, and 65.2% of them do so on the Internet. See http://www.crctaiwan.nctu.edu.tw/
material/files/5358772016.pdf.
9When benchmarking participants’ actual exposure to the website against their self-reported exposure, they
indeed tend to overreport their news consumption. I will discuss this finding in a later section.
10Newspaper readers are attracted to stories because of the content of the headlines or the placement of stories.
Front- page stories are more likely to be read than articles buried near the back of the newspaper (Kahn and
Kenney, 2002).
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For the placebo website, I also update the website daily, selecting news articles from the
entertainment pages. I ensure that the length of the news articles on the placebo website is
similar to that on the treatment website.
An important choice in my design is to truthfully deliver the news source that produced
each news article. I did this not only to avoid deception but also to promote external validity.
Figure B.2 is a screenshot of the website’s front-page; I report the headline of each news
article chosen from The China Times in Appendix Section A, followed by results from a text
analysis of the news articles reported in Appendix Section B.
3.4.1 Browsing Behavior
I use Google Analytics to track participants’ browsing behavior on the website. One
advantage of using this web analytics service is that participants do not need to install any
software to produce the web traffic data. Note that I do not track their external browsing
activities. Results show that 50.05% of treatment group participants visit the site during the
two weeks after they receive the hyperlink. Among these participants, around 93% of them
return to the site (i.e., 6.67% visit the site only once). For thosewho have session recordings,
74.94% of them spend an average of one minute or more per day on the site, and 44.16%
spend an average of three minutes or more on the site.11 88.5% of the visitors (i.e., visit at
least once) complete the endline survey. Table 3.1 reports the mean and standard deviation
of participants’ browsing behavior (both treatment and placebo).
11For the placebo group participants, 50.39% of them visit the website at least once. Among those who visit
thewebsite, 80.52% spend at least an average of oneminute per day browsing thewebsite, and 45.78% spend
at least an average of three minutes per day. These numbers are similar to that of the treatment website.
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Table 3.1: Browsing Behavior
Treatment Group (N=941) Placebo Group (N=377)
Mean SD Mean SD
Panel A. Among all participants (in percentage)
Visited the website at least once 50.05% 50.02% 50.39% 50.06%
Minimal Compliers 37.51% 48.44% 40.58% 49.17%
Full Compliers 22.10% 41.51% 23.07% 42.18%
Panel B. Average browsing time (in minutes)
Visited the website at least once 3.42 3.5 3.38 3.47
Minimal Compliers 4.41 3.53 4.08 3.52
Full Compliers 6.14 3.68 6.05 3.72
Note: Panel A reports the statistic with respect to all participants in the treatment (placebo) group. Panel
B reports average browsing time of participants. Minimal Compliers is a term referring to cases in which an
average of oneminute per day spent visiting the site is the threshold value to define compliers. Full Compliers
refers to the case in which an average of three minutes per day is the threshold value to define compliers.
Figure B.3 reports the distribution of average browsing time among participants who
visit the news website (both treatment and placebo). I also report the browsing activities
across individual and time. In Figure B.4, a red (white) rectangle means that a participant
accesses (does not access) the news site on that date. The figure excludes participants who
never visit the site. Finally, I show that compliers seem distributed evenly among partisan
lines (more details in a later section), implying that participants appear not to live in an
echo chamber in terms of their online news consumption (see Dvir-Gvirsman, Tsfati and
Menchen-Trevino (2016); Garrett (2009); Guess (2020)).
3.4.2 Outcome Variables
I examine three outcome variables: vote decision, candidate evaluation, and opinion
about China. These variables are measured in both survey waves. Below, I describe how
these variables are measured and coded. Table B.2 in Appendix Section C reports summary
statistics of the variables.
Vote decision I measure participants’ baseline vote intent and realized vote choices in the
election. In the baseline survey, participants are asked to name the presidential candidate
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for whom they planned to vote (including the undecided option). I create a variable coded
1 for those whose answer is Han and 0 otherwise to indicate whether a participant intended
to vote for China’s preferred presidential candidate before the experiment. In the endline
survey, I ask participants who report they voted in the election: "Who did you vote for the
presidential candidate (including the void ballot option)?" I create another variable coded
as 1 if participants report that they vote for Han in the election and 0 otherwise. By sub-
tracting the baseline from the endline score, the variable "Change in Vote for Han" is the
shift in vote for Han from the baseline to endline survey.
Candidate Evaluations The feeling thermometer, a standard measure, is used to gauge
participants’ candidate evaluations. I ask participants in both waves: "We would like to
know how you feel about the presidential candidates in the 2020 Election. Please express
your feelings on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means very unfavorable and 10 means very
favorable." Participants are asked to rate each of the three candidates. In the main analysis,
I focus on the comparative feelings towardHan andTsai, the twomain candidates. I subtract
Tsai’s score from Han’s score so that higher scores represent more positive evaluations of
Han. The variable "Change in Candidate Evaluation" is the shift in the Han minus Tsai
feeling thermometer score from the baseline to endline survey (-18 to 18; positive values
indicate Han became more favorable).
Opinions about China I assess participants’ attitudes toward China-related issues by ask-
ing the following five questions in both waves. To mitigate the concern about multiple
testing, I create an index by averaging survey responses to the five questions in each wave
(alpha=0.73 in baseline and 0.80 in endline). Before creating the index, I recode the re-
sponses in a way such that higher scores indicate more favorable to China. I use the index
in the main analysis and report the separate regression results of each survey question in
Appendix Section E. The variable "Change in Pro-China Index" is the shift in the index score
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from the baseline to endline survey, with positive values indicating China became more fa-
vorable to participants.
Variables (scales) Survey Questions
Favorability of China (1–10) We would like to know how you feel about China. If 1 means very unfavorable and 10 means very favorable,
what is your general feeling toward China? (1=very unfavorable; 10=very favorable)
China Threat (1–3) Do you think China’s military is a major threat to Taiwan’s security, a minor threat, or not a threat?
(1= Major threat, 2= Minor threat, 3=No threat)
Trade with China (1–5) Some people claim that we should expand our economic relationship with China, but others advocate reducing that
relationship. What do you think we should do? (1=Greatly reduce the economic relationship; 2= Somewhat reduce
the economic relationship, 3= The current economic relationship is about right, 4= Somewhat expand the economic
relationship, 5= Greatly expand the economic relationship)
Hong Kong Protest (1–5) How much do you support the ongoing protest in Hong Kong? (1=Do not support at all; 2=Somewhat do not support;
3=Neutral; 4=Somewhat support; 5=Strongly support)
Radical Behavior (1–5) To what extent do you agree with the following statement: When the Hong Kong government fails to listen, protesters
are justified in using radical tactics. (1=Strongly disagree; 2=Disagree; 3=Neutral; 4=Agree; 5=Strongly agree)
Political Predispositions To test whether the pro-Beijing media has differential effects on
participants with various political priors, I measure participants’ partisan identities in the
baseline survey. They are asked: “Of the following political parties, which party do you
usually support?” The answer of a participant who names a party is taken to be the party
identification; if a participant does not answer unequivocally, then that participant is asked,
“To which political party are you more inclined?” If the participant names a party, that
answer is taken to be the party identification.
Following most existing research on Taiwanese politics (e.g., Tsai (2017)), I define pan-
Blue participants as those who either support or lean toward the following parties: KMT,
New Party, or People First Party. Pan-Green participants are defined as those who either
support or lean to the following parties: DPP, Taiwan Solidarity Party, Green Party, or New
Power Party. Independent participants, or nonpartisans, are those who neither support nor
lean toward any parties, or those who support or lean to the following two parties: Taiwan
People’s Party or Tree Party, whose positions on Beijing are ambiguous.
This operationalization well captures participants’ pretreatment opinions about China.
Figure B.5 reports the mean scores of the five questions related to China by partisan identi-
ties, showing that pan-Blue participants have significantly more favorable attitudes toward
China a priori, followed by independent and then pan-Green participants. I also regress
people’s baseline scores of the China Index on their personal characteristics (age, educa-
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tion, income level, residence location, and ethnic origin, and partisanship), finding that
partisanship is the strongest predictor, at least four times as much as other demographic
factors.
3.4.3 Logistical Details
Recruitment I commission Qualtrics to recruit Taiwanese citizens eligible to vote in the
2020 election (i.e., 20 years old and above) to participate in a two-wave online survey. Peo-
ple opt in to participate in both waves and can leave the surveys any time. The provision
of the website and monetary rewards is never mentioned during the recruitment, assuag-
ing concerns about sample selection based on participants’ interests in news or financial
incentives a priori.
The baseline survey adopts a quota sample based on age, gender, and partisanship. In
particular, 30% of the experimental sample are pan-Blue participants, another 30% are pan-
Green participants, and the remaining 40% are independents. The partisan distribution
in the sample is consistent with that in the population. In the survey, I measure partic-
ipants’ baseline, pretreatment outcomes, and background information, including demo-
graphic characteristics, partisanship, past voting experience, political interest and engage-
ment in the 2020 election, and media diet. The information serves as the basis for balance
checks and the criteria for heterogeneity analysis.
I successfully recruit 2,077 participants who complete the baseline survey. A total of 195
of the participants are existing consumers of The China Times, and 1,882 of them are not.
Treatment Assignment After concluding this survey, I perform a blocked randomization
based on partisanship for the treatment assignment. This practice in expectation can reduce
sampling variability, as people in the same block are expected to have similar potential out-
comes. It also ensures that a specific proportion of subgroups are available for heteroge-
neous analysis (Gerber and Green, 2012, 71-77).
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I first exclude the 195 participants who are existing China Times consumers from the
sample, then classify participants into one of the three partisan blocks (i.e., pan-Blue, pan-
Green, and independent). In each block, I randomly assign half the participants to the
treatment group, 30% to the control group, and 20% to the placebo group. Together, among
the 1,882 experimental participants, 941 are in the treatment group, 564 in the control group,
and 377 in the placebo group.
Endline Survey In the week following the election, I invite all participants to the endline
survey and successfully recontacted 949 of them (recontact rate = 45.69%). A total of 861
of the 1,882 experimental participants in the baseline survey completed the endline survey
(recontact rate = 45.74%), and 88 of the 195 nonexperimental participants in the baseline
survey completed the endline survey (recontact rate = 45.12%). The attrition rate does not
differ by treatment conditions (p-value = 0.614). The 949 participants constitute the main
sample throughout this study.
Attrition and Balance Check Table 3.2 reports t-tests for selective attrition and ANOVA
tests for sample balance across treatment conditions. Overall, participants who have com-
pleted baseline and those who completed endline are statistically indistinguishable from
each other in terms of demographic characteristics. In addition, participants from the three
experimental conditions are not jointly different from each other across nearly all back-
ground characteristics, even after attrition (the exception is past voting behavior in 2016).
Figure B.7 also confirms that the baseline outcome scores are balanced across conditions.
To further assuage the concern about sample selection bias, I also examine whether the
interaction of background covariates and assignment to treatment predicts attrition. Figure
B.8 shows no evidence that either treatment (i.e., political news website and entertainment
newswebsite) led to a severe sample selection bias in terms of the observable characteristics
of individuals who responded to the endline survey.
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3.5 Results
I first conduct descriptive analyses of the data. Figure 3.2 reports the means of outcome
scores for each experimental condition.12 Results reveal two patterns: (1) the treatment
group is significantly different from both the control and placebo groups; (2) the control
group and placebo group have no discernible difference across all three outcome variables.
I use a one-way ANOVA to test the mean differences of these groups. For vote decisions, I
reject the null hypothesis that the group means are identical [F (2, 735) = 7.50, p=0.0006].
For candidate evaluations, the null hypothesis that changes in candidate evaluations are
indistinguishable across groups is also rejected [F (2, 856) = 6.30, p=0.0019]. Finally, ex-
perimental participants do not hold jointly identical opinions about China before and after
the experiment [F (2, 856) = 8.27, p=0.0003]. The results suggest that the treatment had a
direct influence on behavior and opinions.
Figure 3.2: Changes in Mean Outcome Scores by Experimental Conditions
Note: The left panel plots themeans of individual-level changes in vote decisions in Han’s favor (N=738). The
middle panel is changes in candidate evaluations in Han’s favor (N=861). The right panel is changes in mean
scores of the China Index (N=861). The outcomes are change scores from the baseline to endline survey.
I examine the differences in a regression framework. For simplicity and greater statistical
power, the following analysis pools the control group with placebo group together because
12Note that the outcome variables in the main analysis are change scores rather than endline scores; I show in
Online Appendix that my results are identical to results using endline scores as the outcome and baseline
scores as the control.
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they do not differ in any outcome dimension (seeAppendix SectionD for results comparing
control and placebo group). As I show below, the placebo group allows me to address
multiple concerns about the results and to evaluate possible mechanisms underlying the
treatment effect.
Both intent-to-treat (ITT) and treatment-on-the-treated (TOT) effects are estimated in
this paper. ITT refers to the effects of treatment assignment on outcomes by comparing out-
comes of participants assigned to treatment and control, regardless of whether participants
are actually treated. In this study the ITT estimates refer to the effects of providing access
to the pro-Beijing website, which average the effects on compliers and noncompliers. The
TOT estimates, by contrast, refer to the effects on those who spend some time browsing the
pro-Beijing news website. I expect that TOT effects are larger than ITT effects.
To estimate ITT, I regress outcome scores on treatment status indicator. For TOT effects,
I use two-stage least squares estimand, widely used in field experiments following the ap-
proach of Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996). Because website access is randomly assigned,
I use it to instrument participants’ exposure to the news website (first stage) and then use
the exogenous variation in exposure to estimate its effects on outcomes (second stage). The
TOT estimates are unbiased when exclusion restriction and monotonicity are met.
For TOT, I use two different threshold values to distinguish compliers and noncompliers.
I define participants who spend an average of three minutes or more browsing the website
during the two-weekwindow as compliers (Full Compliers). A less strict definition of com-
pliers is that those who spend an average of one minute or more are considered compliers
(Minimal Compliers).
Become Prone to Vote for Beijing’s Preferred Candidates Participants in the treatment
group become more likely than those in the control group to vote for China’s preferred
presidential candidate Han (p-value = .001). The ITT effect is estimated between 0.06 and
0.183 for a mean change in Vote for Han of 0.144, on a scale coded between -1 and 1. This
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represents a 0.28 standard deviation difference between the two groups, a nontrivial differ-
ence. I also find that the effect is significantly larger among those who have not made their
vote decisions in the baseline.
I next turn to TOT effects. Both Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3 show that the estimated TOT
seems larger than the estimated ITT. Comparing the coefficient sizes of the two complier
cutoffs shows that the effects are more pronounced among those who spend more time
on the website. Some evidence indicates that existing consumers become slightly willing
to vote for Han in the election, but the estimate is not precise enough to reject the null
hypothesis.
Appendix Section F provides evidence on how the pro-Beijing media moves votes. It
shows that the pro-Beijing media mainly persuade those undecided on whom to vote for in
the baseline survey to choose Han rather than deter voters from their vote intention.
Figure 3.3: Coefficient Plot: ITT, TOT, and Existing Consumers
Note: Regression estimates of intent-to-treat effects and treatment-on-the-treated effects with 95% and 90%
confidence intervals, respectively. This plot reports the estimated treatment effects on vote decisions, candi-
date evaluations, and beliefs on China. ITT is estimated by comparing outcomes of the treatment group and
control group (control + placebo participants). TOT is estimated by two-stage least squares regression, in
which the treatment assignment indicator is used to instrument for compliers. The exogenous variation in
compliers is then used to estimate the relationship between exposure to the pro-Beijing news (compliers) and
the three outcome variables. Existing Consumers refer to those who already read The China Times regularly
on a daily basis. The estimate for them is the mean differences of baseline and endline.
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ChangeCandidate Evaluations inHan’s Favor Evidence on candidate evaluations is con-
sistent with the findings in vote decisions, which may not be a surprise in that people’s
feelings about candidates are often proximate to their vote choices. Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3
show that treatment group participants becomemore positive towardHan than those in the
control group (p-value = .001). The ITT effect is estimated to be between 0.36 and 1.24 for
a mean change in Candidate Evaluations of 0.056. This means that the two groups differ by
0.24 standard deviation. The estimated TOT is larger than the estimated ITT. By contrast no
evidence shows that existing consumers become more favorable to Han during the study
period. The coefficient is almost zero and has a wrong sign. The Online Appendix reports
separate regression coefficients on each of the three presidential candidates’ feeling ther-
mometers. On average, the treatment had a positive effect on evaluation of Han, negative
effect on Tsai, and indiscernible effect on Soong.
More favorable toward China The treatment group becomesmore positive toward China
in the endline than the control group does (p-value = .001). ITT is estimated to be between
0.12 and 0.34 for a mean change in the China Index of 0.11, which represents the difference
in the two groups by a 0.27 standard deviation in the endline. TOT estimates are larger
than ITT estimates. The comparison of TOT estimates using different complier cutoffs once
again confirms that the positive effects are more noticeable among those more engaged in
the treatmentwebsite. For the existing consumers, weak evidence shows that their opinions
about China become more approving in the study period.
Appendix Section E reports separate regression results on the five China items, show-
ing that the treatment group participants at the end of the experiment have more positive
feelings toward China, become less likely to view China as a threat, become more eager to
have trade with China, and become more negative to the 2019–2020 Hong Kong Protests
than control group participants. The effect size of TOT seems larger than ITT.
Onemore issue can bolster the results. Aroundmid-December 2019, theAnti-Infiltration
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Act became a central issue in the presidential election campaign. The DPP claims that the
passage of the act is necessary to regulate the potential Chinese influences on Taiwan’s do-
mestic politics. The pro-Beijing media publishes several news articles against such a propo-
sition (see Appendix Section A). I thus evaluate whether the opinions of participants in the
treatment group and control group differ on this new act. I solicit supports for the act only
in the endline because when the baseline survey was in the field, this act had not received
media attention. This is also the reason I did not preregister this question. The question
reads as follows:
The anti-infiltration bill was passed by the legislature on Dec. 31, 2019. Some people
think the bill would further hamper cross-strait exchanges, but others claim that the bill
is a safety net for our democracy. We would like to ask how strongly you support the bill.
The variable is measured on a 5-point scale, ranging from "very supportive" (1) to "not
supportive at all" (5). It has a mean of 3.004 and a standard deviation of 1.201. Results
show that (not reported) the treatment group participants were less supportive of the Anti-
Infiltration Act than the control group participants (p-value = .001). In terms of ITT, the
two groups differ by a 0.226 standard deviation.
Conditional Treatment Effects At the outset I expected that the treatment would have
stronger effects among those politically inattentive than among those who are attentive
(H2). Figure 3.4 shows that the effects are indeed significantly greater among those who
less care about the election outcome (or who are less interested in the election campaign)
prior to the experiment. By contrast the effects are indistinguishable from zero among those
who are already politically informed.13
13I use several survey questions to measure people’s political awareness or engagement, finding that the re-
sults are largely robust to all these different measures, including the frequency of sharing political news on
social media, the frequency of acquiring news in the mass media, and the amount of time spent acquiring
election news the previous week. See the wording of the survey item and results in Online Appendix.
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Figure 3.4: Experimental Effects Conditional on Political Engagement
I also expected that the treatment would have stronger (weaker) effects among those
who perceive (do not perceive) The China Times as a credible media outlet (H3). Respon-
dents in the endline survey are asked how much they agree that The China Times is a red
media. This variable is used as a proxy for participants’ perceptions of The China Times’
credibility. Figure 3.5 indicates that the treatment effects are weak and negligible among
participants who view The China Times as a CCP-aligned media outlet. In contrast, the ef-
fects are stronger among those who disagree with this statement.
Figure 3.5: Experimental Effects Conditional on Perceived Credibility of The China Times
NewsContent orNewsSource? Onemayworry that the results are driven bynews source
rather than news content. The political news on the website includes information about
the news source, so participants know the news articles are from The China Times; thus,
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they may modify their beliefs based on the source cue. The placebo website helps me to
address this concern. Because the source of the entertainment news is also from The China
Times, significant differences in outcomes across the treatment group and the placebo group
participants suggest that the news source, which holds constant, is not the driver of the
results. I reanalyze the data by comparing outcomes of treatment group and placebo group,
finding that the main results are still robust (see Figure 3.6). I also estimate the complier
average causal effect, that is, effects among compliers.
Figure 3.6: Coefficient Plot: ITT and CACE (Treatment vs. Placebo Group)
Note: Estimated intent-to-treat effects and complier average causal effects, with 95% and 90% confidence in-
tervals, respectively. I estimate ITT effect by comparing outcomes of the treatment and the placebo group
(placebo group is the baseline group). I estimate CACE by comparing outcomes of the treatment and the
placebo group, conditional on compliers. Compliers are defined as those who spend an average of three
minutes per day during the experiment period. In mathematical terms, CACE = E(Y1-Y0 | Complier=1).
Misreporting Vote Choices? One may worry that participants hide their real vote choice
in the survey. Even if I cannot know which people misreport their vote choice, I use a list
experiment to test whether participants in the aggregate hide their choices. The list experi-
ment is designed in the following way: all participants in the endline survey are randomly
assigned to two groups and are provided with a list of things that they may have done.
The list for the control group contains four baseline items (watched movie in a theater,
bought Taiwan Lottery tickets, gave money to a charitable organization, and travelled to a
foreign country). The treatment group receives a different list that includes the same base-
line items plus a sensitive one: “After the election outcome came out this time, I hid my
56
true vote choice when asked whom I voted for.” All participants are then asked to tell how
many of these things (instead of which thing) on the list they have done. Figure 3.10 shows
that the two groups are indistinguishable in terms of the item counts (estimate = -0.030
[-0.188, 0.128]; N=949). I also perform a subgroup analysis of the pan-Blue participants,
who may misreport support for the winner (Wright, 1993) but find no evidence that these
participants on the aggregate level had been deceptive about their vote choices (estimate =
-0.069 [-0.355, 0.217]; N=300).
3.6 Effect Heterogeneity
This section reports the results of subgroup analyses by partisanship to test my hypoth-
esis that the pro-Beijing media has heterogeneous effects on people with opposing priors.
3.6.1 Heterogeneous Effects by Political Predispositions
Figure 3.7 reports both ITT and TOT estimates with their corresponding confidence in-
tervals. Consistent with the effect heterogeneity hypothesis, the positive treatment effects
occur in the pan-Blue and independent samples. The effects appear slightly stronger for
Independents, which is consistent with the claim that nonpartisans are more influenced by
additional information received. For pan-Blue participants, the treatment effects indicate
that exposure to the pro-Beijing news can reinforce their preexisting beliefs.
By contrast a backfire effect is found in the pan-Green sample. The pro-Beijing media
moves pan-Green participants’ feelings about Han and opinions about China downward.
Both ITT and TOT estimates on pan-Green participants’ vote decisions are small and close
to zero; this is likely because 80.6% of them already intended to vote for Tsai in the baseline
survey so the glass ceiling limits the treatment effects. In contrast only 52.9% of pan-Blue
participants in the baseline survey intended to choose Han in the election (See Appendix
Section E and the conclusion section for more discussion). Appendix Section G reports the
regression results of the subgroup analyses.
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Figure 3.7: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Partisanship
Note: ITT and TOT estimates on outcome variable with corresponding 95% and 90% CIs, respectively. I con-
duct three subgroup analyses for each outcome variable. Pan-blue voters are those participants who report
in the baseline survey that they either support or lean toward the following parties: KMT, New Party, Party
First Party. Pan-green voters are those participants who report in the baseline that they either support or lean
toward the following parties: DPP, Taiwan Solidarity Party, Green Party, New Power Party. Independent vot-
ers are those participants who claim that they are not inclined to any political parties or those inclined toward
Taiwan People’s Party or Tree Party. Estimates are drawn from people who complete both survey waves.
3.6.2 Why Heterogeneity?
I demonstrate thatmotivatedpolitical reasoningmay account for the effect heterogeneity
observed among partisans. If biased reasoning is the main mechanism driving the results,
participants with opposing partisan attachments should exhibit differential cognitive and
emotional reactions to the persuasive messages. In the endline survey, I ask a battery of
questions measuring individuals’ reactions to the news articles on the website to which
they have access. I present the questions only to participants in the treatment and placebo
groups who report that they browse the website that they were invited to visit.
Quality and Argument Strength The first set of questions asks participants to rate the
overall quality and argument strength of the news articles that they read on the website.14
14For the Quality question, I ask participants: "What do you think of the overall quality of the news articles
you read on the website?"Wemeasure this question on a seven-point scale, where 1 refers to extremely poor
quality and 7 refers to extremely good quality. For the question on Argument Strength, I ask participants:
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These questions serve to test whether people evaluate like-minded arguments as stronger
and more compelling than opposing arguments (Lodge and Taber, 2013). I expect that in
the treatment group, pan-Blue participants have more positive evaluations of the quality
and argument strength of the news articles than pan-Green participants.
Emotion and Reactance Emotion has received growing scholarly attention in the study of
motivated political reasoning. Recent studies find that anger is nearly alone in motivating
individuals to engage in selective information processing (Hasell and Weeks, 2016; Suhay
and Erisen, 2018). People experience anger when their values (Mullen and Skitka, 2006)
or political opinions (Redlawsk, 2002) are threatened. Irritation then causes people to lean
on their prior beliefs and respond in a hostile manner toward ideas that undermine them
(Lazarus, 1991).
I ask participants how the news articles they read on the website make them feel. I mea-
sure four emotions and use them to create two variables.15 Specifically, Positive Emotion
is the average of the scores of participants’ responses to two feelings items—hope and en-
thusiasm—related to their positive feelings to the news articles. Negative Emotion is the
average scores of participants’ responses to two feeling items — anger and disgust — re-
lated to their negative feelings to the news stories. I expect that pan-Blue participants feel
more positive toward the pro-Beijing news than pan-Green participants.
Traditional psychologists have long found that when people feel someone or something
is trying to take away their choices or limit the range of alternatives, they tend to exhibit
“reactance” by adopting or strengthening a view contrary to what was intended (Brehm
et al., 1966). I solicit participants’ reactance scores using the following questions developed
by Dillard and Shen (2005):
"Generally speaking, how weak or strong do you think the argument was in the news articles you read.
Again, please use the 7-point scale."
15The question reads as follows: "Generally speaking, how do the news articles you read on the website make
you feel? Please rate your feelings about the news articles on a scale from 1 (feel no emotion at all) to 7 (feel
emotion very strongly)."
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• The news reports threatened my freedom to choose candidates.
• The news reports tried to make a decision for me.
• The news reports tried to manipulate me.
• The news reports tried to pressure me.
Participants are asked to use 1–5 to express the degree towhich they agreewith the state-
ments, where 1 means strongly disagree and 5 means strongly agree. I create the variable
Reactance by averaging their responses to the four questions, with higher values represent-
ing higher reactance. Among those in the treatment group, pan-Green participants should
express higher reactance scores than pan-Blue participants.
Figure 3.8 reports mean scores with 95% CIs of participants’ cognitive and affective re-
actions to pro-Beijing news articles. Results show that despite viewing the identical news,
pan-Blue participants have more positive cognitive responses and positive affects to the
political news than pan-Green participants. Both cognitive and emotional responses are
"partisan," that is, in a direction consistent with how the treatment shifts the attitudes and
behavior of the partisans in this study.
A Placebo Test One can argue that the differential cognitive and emotional reactions by
partisanship are driven by news source rather than news content because participants may
have known where The China Times stands relative to other media outlets. Cases can be
made that pan-Green (pan-Blue) participants have more negative (positive) responses to
the news not because the content of the slanted news is inconsistent (consistent) with their
priors but because the news is from The China Times (See Baum and Gussin (2008) in the
U.S. context).
To address this alternative explanation, I focus on the placebo group participants. If
news source rather than news content is the driver of partisans’ differential reactions, pan-
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Figure 3.8: Cognitive and Affective Reactions to Political News
(a) Quality of News Reports (b) Argument Strength
(c) Positive Feeling (d) Negative Feeling (e) Reactance
Note: These plots show the differences in mean scores between pan-Blue and pan-Green respon-
dents exposed to the treatment website for their cognitive and emotional reactions to the news
articles on the site. The bars indicate 95% CI. The plots also report the results of Wilcoxon test that
compares group means. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Blue and pan-Green participants in the placebo group should also exhibit differential cogni-
tive and emotional reactions to the news articles because the articles are also from The China
Times. Figure 3.9 shows that this is not the case because the partisan pattern observed in
the treatment group disappear in the placebo group. Partisans in the placebo group have
similar cognitive reactions to the entertainment news, so do their affective reactions (except
for negative emotions). Since the news source holds constant across groups, the lack of par-
tisan reactions in the placebo group suggests that the news source does not trigger biased
information processing.
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Figure 3.9: Cognitive and Affective Reactions to Entertainment News
(a) Quality of News Reports (b) Argument Strength
(c) Positive Feeling (d) Negative Feeling (e) Reactance
Note: These plots show the differences in mean scores between pan-Blue and pan-Green respon-
dents exposed to the placebo website for their cognitive and emotional reactions to the news ar-
ticles on the site. The bars indicate 95% CI. The plots also report the results of Wilcoxon test that
compares group means. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ns p>0.05
3.7 Conclusion
This study offers the first field experiment that examines the impact of pro-Beijingmedia
on voter behaviors and opinions during a presidential election. The evidence yields three
major findings. First, the pro-Beijing media messages are capable of swaying Taiwanese
voters, one of the most important targets by the Chinese government, in the intended di-
rection. More generally, political context seems to play an important role in determining
the effectiveness of China’s information operations abroad. Second, the pro-Beijing media
exert differential effects on voters with opposing political priors. Third, the effects seemme-
diated by voters’ cognitive and emotional reactions to the political news received. In sum,
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because Taiwan is not the only case that China intends to wield its influence using co-opted
friendly media, what China does and how Taiwan reacts have ramifications for citizens in
Hong Kong, Australia, and even the United States.
The research findings are a contribution to the existing literature and theorizing on the
potential backfire effects of exposure to dissimilar political information. Contrary to some
recent evidence, which finds exposure to opposing views to have no impact, and in linewith
other studies, my study shows that backfire effect is not the exception. Extending past work
by incorporating people’s evaluations of the accessed articles, the backfire effect found in
this study seems to have its trace from people’s cognitive and emotional reactions to the
articles.
In addition, this study also makes a contribution to the growing body of work that uses
behavioral data to study people’s attitudes and behavior uponmedia exposure. Rather than
relying on a forced exposure design, I incentivized exposure and accounted for compliance.
Rather than asking participants to self report exposure, I tracked their actual exposure pat-
terns on the news website. My research design combining systematic experimental treat-
ment, online traces, and surveys pre- and post-experiment is most apt to accurately and
precisely documenting the existence (or rather lack thereof) of pro-Beijing media effects.
People havemore to learn about the effects of pro-Beijingmedia than can be revealed in a
single experimental study. I hasten to note the scope of my evidence. First, the reader must
be cautious in generalizing my findings to any broad inference because the experimental
results may depend on several features of the 2020 Taiwanese presidential election. The
election may be unique because Han is a nontraditional presidential candidate of the KMT.
My survey data shows thatmanypan-Blue partisans seem less determined in this election to
make up their minds. This would give this experiment more room to sway their candidate
preferences and choices. Specifically, among the experimental participants, the odds of
being undecided in the baseline survey for pan-Blue voters is 2.32 times that of pan-Green
voters, holding personal characteristics constant. Further evidence of this is that among
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those who selected the KMT presidential candidate in 2012, nearly 35% report that they are
undecided and only 37.7% report they would vote for Han in the baseline survey. In stark
contrast among those who voted for the DPP presidential candidate in 2012, only 15.8% are
undecided and 75.4% decided to choose Tsai Ing-wen in the baseline survey.16
Second, more research should be conducted in different countries using field experi-
ments to evaluate whether my findings are replicable in countries with similar political
context. In the existing literature on media persuasion using a field experiment during
elections, virtually all evidence is from the United States and Western European countries.
More evidence beyond these countries is clearly needed.
16As to participants’ (self-reported) voting behavior in 2012, apart from those who selected either the KMT
or DPP presidential candidates discussed above in the main text, 82 participants say that they voted for the
third-party candidate; 354 participants did not vote; 268 participants were under 20 in 2012 and ineligible
to vote; and 253 participants no longer remember for whom they voted in 2012.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics, Attrition, and Balance Tests
Sample and Attrition Treatment Balance
Variable Baseline Endline t-test Existing Control Placebo Treatment ANOVA
Mean Mean p-value Mean Mean Mean Mean Test
(SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD) p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age 37.584 38.217 0.281 42.830 37.527 37.933 37.805 0.920
(11.460) (11.133) (12.780) (10.890) (11.277) (10.684)
Female 0.495 0.498 0.619 0.375 0.519 0.476 0.519 0.602
(0.500) (0.500) (0.487) (0.501) (0.501) (0.500)
Residence 0.821 0.821 0.846 0.875 0.827 0.835 0.801 0.530
(0.383) (0.384) (0.333) (0.379) (0.372) (0.400)
Education 4.614 4.590 0.154 4.920 4.585 4.598 4.524 0.642
(1.032) (1.027) (0.937) (1.046) (1.078) (1.003)
Full-Time Job 0.735 0.736 0.613 0.739 0.700 0.750 0.751 0.307
(0.441) (0.441) (0.442) (0.459) (0.434) (0.433)
Married 0.483 0.484 0.579 0.636 0.458 0.494 0.465 0.751
(0.500) (0.500) (0.484) (0.499) (0.501) (0.499)
Income 6.039 6.022 0.652 7.227 5.831 6.335 5.776 0.136
(3.257) (3.150) (3.132) (3.166) (2.912) (3.175)
Pan-Blue 0.306 0.316 0.492 0.557 0.300 0.287 0.288 0.937
(0.461) (0.465) (0.500) (0.459) (0.454) (0.454)
Independent 0.399 0.390 0.504 0.205 0.400 0.427 0.407 0.858
(0.490) (0.488) (0.406) (0.491) (0.496) (0.492)
Pan Green 0.295 0.294 0.965 0.239 0.300 0.287 0.304 0.914
(0.456) (0.456) (0.429) (0.459) (0.454) (0.461)
Vote in 2016 0.587 0.599 0.296 0.682 0.531 0.671 0.595 0.016
(0.493) (0.490) (0.468) (0.500) (0.471) (0.491)
Vote in 2012 0.579 0.591 0.279 0.727 0.538 0.604 0.590 0.305
(0.494) (0.492) (0.448) (0.499) (0.491) (0.492)
Ethnicity 0.647 0.653 0.690 0.625 0.669 0.701 0.632 0.242
(0.478) (0.476) (0.487) (0.471) (0.459) (0.483)
Religion 0.204 0.209 0.475 0.125 0.223 0.268 0.195 0.143
(0.403) (0.407) (0.333) (0.417) (0.444) (0.396)
Newspaper 0.450 0.446 0.741 0.330 0.458 0.433 0.467 0.760
Preferences (0.498) (0.497) (0.473) (0.499) (0.497) (0.499)
TV Program 2.763 2.776 0.713 2.955 2.665 2.841 2.780 0.157
Preferences (0.995) (0.993) (1.060) (1.002) (0.978) (0.976)
Control 0.300 0.302 0.842 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 ———
(0.458) (0.459)
Placebo 0.200 0.190 0.327 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 ———
(0.400) (0.393)
Treatment 0.500 0.508 0.548 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 ———
(0.500) (0.500)
Obs. 2077 949 ——— 88 260 164 437 ———
Note: Mean level of each characteristics are reported in column 1 for all respondents who completed the baseline survey (and corre-
sponding standard deviation in parentheses). Column 2 for respondents who completed the endline survey (standard deviation in
parentheses). For each characteristic, a t-test is conducted against the null hypothesis that respondents who have completed baseline
and those who have completed endline do not differ from each other in terms of this characteristic. Column 3 reports the p-value for each
test. Column 4 for endline participants who are China Times readers, column 5 for endline participants in the control group, column 6 for
endline participants existing in the placebo group, and column 7 for endline participants in the treatment group. For each characteristic,
an ANOVA test in conducted against the null hypothesis that participants in the control, placebo, and treatment groups do not jointly
differ from each other in terms of this characteristic. Column 9 reports the corresponding p-value for each test.
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Table 3.3: Treatment Effects on Behavior and Attitudes
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Vote for Han Candidate Evaluation Pro-China Index
Panel A: Reduced Form
Intent-to-treat 0.122*** 0.805*** 0.233***
(0.031) (0.226) (0.057)
Panel B: Two-stage estimates
Treatment-on-the-treated 0.168*** 1.116*** 0.323***
(Minimal Complier) (0.043) (0.310) (0.079)
Treatment-on-the-treated 0.280*** 1.880*** 0.543***
(Full Complier) (0.072) (0.520) (0.132)
Observations 738 861 861
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel C: Mean (SD)
Nonexisting consumers 0.144 0.056 0.117
(experimental sample) (0.431) (3.351) (0.848)
Control Group 0.077 (0.323) (0.010)
(0.410) (2.755) (0.614)
Placebo Group 0.087 (0.396) 0.015
(0.385) (2.952) (0.723)
Treatment Group 0.203 0.453 0.232
(0.452) (3.750) (0.986)
Existing consumers 0.078 (0.102) 0.050
(0.532) (3.760) (0.729)
Note: This table reports regression coefficients with robust standard errors on outcomes variables. Column
1 for changes in vote for Han. Column 2 for changes in candidate evaluations. Column 3 for changes in the
China Index scores. The index is generated by averaging the scores of five variables related to opinions about
China. I record all variables such that higher values mean China’s preferred behavior and attitudes. Panel
A shows ITT estimates, where I regress outcome variables on the treatment status indicators. Panel B shows
TOT estimates via two-stage regressions, where I use the treatment assignment indicator to estimate a first
stage regarding whether participants are compliers. Panel C shows the means and standard deviations of the
three outcome variables for the experimental sample and the nonexperimental sample. All statistics in the
table are based on participants who complete both surveys.
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Figure 3.10: List Experiment Embedded in the Endline (N=949)
Note: The experiment evaluates whether my participants provide deceived self-reports of their real vote deci-
sion at the aggregate level. The dots represent point estimates and bars the corresponding confidence interval
at .05 level. The figure plots the model and data (distribution of observations) together.
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Chapter 4
Persuasive Backfiring: A Survey Experiment on Citizen
Compliance in China
4.1 Introduction
The centrality of taxation in state-building processes of developing countries receives
growing attention (Brautigam, Fjeldstad and Moore, 2008). The demand for healthcare,
educational opportunities, and other essential public services presses governments to urge
taxpayers not to evade or underdeclare their tax obligations. The task of ensuring taxpayers
to comply with government demand for taxation is as challenging as it is fundamental.
According to an article in China Briefing News (2014), tax evasion has cost the Chinese
economy an annual loss of 134 billion USD in tax revenues. Business elites especially tend
to find ways, such as using bogus invoices and minimizing the paper trail to hide their
revenue, to circumvent tax payments. A survey conducted by China’s National Audit Office
in 2004 shows that 788 large firms previously regarded as having sound accounting systems
avoided paying 11% of their taxes over 2 years, equating to 25 billion yuan (Li and Ma,
2015, p.1). The Chinese government has consistently announced that it will get tough on
tax evasion (China Daily, 2002; Wall Street Journal, 2016).
Although many possible factors could account for tax noncompliance in China, inter-
view evidence suggests that many firm managers evade taxes because they think that the
tax funds collected are not spent on projects that benefit the public and that government
officials do not provide adequate public goods for their businesses to thrive. In one of my
interviews, a firmmanager notes that "if there is no way to buy a good government, why do
I bother spending so much money on taxes?" This view aligns with the social contract the-
ory, which contends that reciprocal relations between state and society drive individuals’
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willingness to pay taxes. In this theory, people equate tax payments with signing a so-
cial contract with governments, which are expected to supply goods and services deemed
important by their constituents in exchange for tax revenues. Tax compliance to a great ex-
tent hinges on individuals’ perceptions of government responsiveness and representation.
However, prior studies of this topic focus predominantly on developed democracies and
conclude that "it is difficult to think of a psychological tax contract in autocratic regimes"
(Feld and Frey, 2007, p.107). Therefore, our understanding of whether such social contract
thesis exists in authoritarian countries like China is still limited.
A recent political change inChina offers a valuable opportunity to examinewhether peo-
ple’s tax compliance depends on their perceptions of government responsiveness. Schol-
ars have reported a new pattern of congressional responsiveness unfolding in local China,
showing that congress delegates are increasingly responsive to personal contacts and ad-
vocate local governments to deliver local public services (Manion, 2016). I exploit this po-
litical change to investigate the impact of individuals’ beliefs in government responsiveness
on their tax compliance.
A major empirical challenge in identifying such impact is that both perceptions of gov-
ernment and willingness to pay taxes could be driven by observable and unobservable fac-
tors. To overcome this issue, I conduct an original survey experiment that randomly assigns
prospective business elites to receive information about increased congressional represen-
tation in local China. This political information is designed to update people’s perceptions
of government responsiveness, helping me credibly estimate the causal impact of exposure
to the information on individuals’ compliance attitudes.
Results show that the informational treatment significantly swayed people’s willingness
to pay taxes but in an unintended direction: Respondents who were prompted by the infor-
mation on average exhibited lower tax compliance. Two pieces of evidence indicate that the
results are not a statistical artifact. First, a manipulation check shows that the information
updated beliefs in congressional responsiveness downward. Treatment group respondents
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on average had a lower level of beliefs than control group respondents that local congress
delegates are willing to respond to citizen demand. Second, the negative treatment effects
still hold when using different compliance measures and model specifications. Together, I
show that individuals’ beliefs about government responsiveness could influence their tax
compliance, suggesting that the psychological social contract may exist in both democracies
and autocracies.
The backfire effect seems puzzling at first glance because the political information pro-
vided in this study was a positive message about local congresses. A more in-depth exam-
ination, however, reveals that a large proportion of study participants viewed the message
as state propaganda. Many respondents linked the political informationwith government’s
attempt at propagating a political reality that is not really the case. They did not believe the
persuasive argument and thought it is not consistent with what they saw and experienced.
In line with Taber and Lodge (2006) and Redlawsk (2002), my study participants exposed
to the informational treatment thus reported opinions more extreme than they otherwise
would do. Since the prospective business elites in the study seem to possess a strong prior
belief that local Chinese officials tend not to deliver sufficient public goods and services, as
my interviews suggest, they may dismiss and even counterargue the information received.
Consequently, the informational treatment resulted in the opposite of the intended effect,
diminishing people’s tax compliance.
My findings have important implications for three different lines of the literature. The
first is political economy of taxation. I show that in authoritarian countries like China, peo-
ple’s perceptions of political representation and accountability could affect their tax compli-
ance. As in democracies, the reciprocal relations between state and society in authoritarian
China matter for people’s willingness to follow their tax obligations. In contrast to previ-
ous work, I find empirical support for the fiscal social contract in the authoritarian context.
The second is political communication in the form of persuasion. My findings are consis-
tent with Huang (2018) and Bush et al. (2016) that hard propaganda often has a limited,
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even backfire, impact on behavior and attitudes of people exposed to it. More broadly, I
challenge the contention that political persuasion rarely backfires even under the most de-
sirable condition (Guess and Coppock, 2018). The third is congressional politics in China.
In contrast to extant research that considers congressional representation as the outcome
variable (Manion, 2016; Truex, 2016), I employ it as the key explanatory variable. My find-
ings suggest that even if Chinese local congresses have become more responsive, the way
in which the ruling authorities communicate the political change with their citizens plays
an important role in determining its political consequences.
4.2 Why Tax Compliance?
Existing literature has ascribed tax compliance to deterrence andmorale. For deterrence,
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) apply the Becker (1968) model of economic crime to show
that individuals’ compliance decisions depend on the expected utility of tax evasion, which
is influenced by tax rates, odds of detection, and penalty to be paid if found guilty. Scholars
later show, however, that the deterrence theory weights economic factors so much that it
fails to explain why the actual compliance levels are often higher than predicted (Alm,
McClelland and Schulze, 1992, 1999; Graetz and Wilde, 1985; Slemrod, Blumenthal and
Christian, 2001). Scholars are thus prompted to find nondeterrence factors that fall outsides
the expected utility model but could affect tax compliance — tax morale.
Government’s ability to collect taxes also depends on people’s willingness to pay them.
Tax morale is widely used as an umbrella concept to describe people’s sociopsychological
motivations to comply with tax regulations (Luttmer and Singhal, 2014).1 Scholars have
proposed four main morale-related factors that could influence tax compliance. The first is
social norms, such as a feeling of pride, a sense of civic duties, altruism toward others, and
an inclination to avoid feeling guilt and shame. In examining the impact of social norms on
1Hereafter, I use tax morale, willingness to pay taxes, and tax compliance attitudes interchangeably.
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compliance, scholars randomly send letters or emails containing moral suasion messages
to test whether they promote people’s tax compliance attitudes and behavior (Blumenthal
et al., 2001; Torgler, 2004). The second is related to peer effects (i.e., howothers pay taxes). A
study in the United Kingdom finds evidence to support this claim (Hallsworth et al., 2017),
but studies in Australia (Fellner, Sausgruber and Traxler, 2013) and in Peru (Carpio, 2013)
find null effects. The third is cultural traits: observed differences in tax compliance levels
persists over time and may be explained by different cultures across countries (Cummings
et al., 2009; Halla, 2012).
The fourth, which is the interest of this paper, is the so-called fiscal social contract: citi-
zens view tax payments as signing a contract with governments in return for public goods
and services. Tax compliance is therefore motivated by people’s attitudes toward govern-
ments, such as whether they feel active in the decision-making process (Feld and Tyran,
2002; Lü and Tsai, 2016), whether they perceive the state as legitimate (Levi, 1989), whether
they have positive opinions about governing institutions (Torgler, 2005), and whether they
feel the tax authorities fairly treat them (Torgler, 2007). Together, all these studies suggest
that tax compliance embodies a reciprocal relation between governments and the public.
To date, empirical evidence on the social contract thesis is mixed. Blumenthal et al.
(2001) randomly send out letters with the breakdown of government spending on social
programs. Castro and Scartascini (2015) randomly inform taxpayers of specific public goods
in their community. Dwenger et al. (2016) randomly send out letters containing the infor-
mation about local German church tax revenues. All of them find null effects on taxpayers.
By contrast, Hallsworth et al. (2017) find evidence that taxpayers are more compliant with
the tax lawwhen receiving information highlighting the breakdown of public expenditures.
Lü and Tsai (2016) also find that Chinese citizens are more willing to pay property taxes
when they have a chance to participate in the design of new tax laws.
In this paper, I overcome three issues often encountered in existing literature on tax
compliance. First, I adopt an experimental method to avoid the endogeneity concern in-
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herited in standard survey studies, such as Daude, Gutiérrez and Sánchez (2013). Second,
the subject pool of previous lab and survey experiments mostly comprises college students,
who tend to have no experience in paying taxes. By contrast, my study participants have
had at least two-years’ full-time working experience and are real taxpayers. More impor-
tantly, because of their college training and working experience, my study participants are
arguably prospective business elites, whose tax compliance attitudes and behaviors are cru-
cially important to the Chinese government. Third, most extant studies focus primarily on
European, Latin American, and African countries but little on Asian (let alone authoritar-
ian) countries.2 This paper fills in the gap by fielding a survey experiment in China with
prospective business elites to study whether taxpayers modify compliance levels as a result
of exposure to information about enhanced congressional representation.
4.3 Theoretical Expectations
Fiscal Social Contract in Taxation The first theoretical building block of this paper is so-
cial contract theory, which posits that individuals consider paying taxes as an establishment
of a contractual relationship with governments. As a result, people who perceive that gov-
ernments sufficiently represent and respond to citizen demand are expected to be more
willing to pay taxes. This theory has deep roots in early modern Europe, where monarchs
were compelled to relinquish some of their power to legislative institutions in exchange for
the ability to raise new taxes (Moore, 2004).
As Tilly (1992) noted, representative institutions in the case of England were the out-
come of bargaining with the public for the wherewithal of state activity, especially the
means of war. Kings of England initially did not form a representative institution but grad-
ually conceded to barons, clergy, gentry, and the bourgeoisie to raise more tax revenues for
warfare. This is where the notion no taxation without representation comes from. In addition,
2Some exceptions are Lü and Tsai (2016); Kao, Lü and Queralt (2021)
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the reciprocal relations between state and society are also seen in the resource curse litera-
ture: Dictators circumvent pressures to implement representative institutions because they
finance themselves with nontax revenues from natural resources such as petroleum (Ross,
2001).
This contractual relationship between state and society also involves public goods and
provisions. Levi (1989) argues that citizens pay taxes largely because they perceive delivery
of public services to the public by the government in return. To make the link between tax
payments and public provisions clearer, governments also establish representative institu-
tions (e.g., legislature) to lower the compliance cost. Timmons (2005) finds that countries
with a high proportion of revenues from personal income and business taxes have better
property protection rights, but countries relyingmore on regressive taxes have higher social
spending.
In sum, according to the social contract theory, to encourage individuals’ tax compli-
ance, taxpayers need to be informed and persuaded that governments are responsive to
citizen interests. Taxpayers’ perceptions of whether government officials deliver sufficient
public goods and services will subsequently affect their willingness to pay. This theory is
psychological in nature.
Political Representation in China? Can the social contract theory travel to authoritarian
countries like China? Conventional wisdom holds democracy to be a necessary condition
for meaningful representation and accountability. That some scholars argue that "it will be
difficult to think of a psychological tax contract in autocratic regimes" (Feld and Frey, 2007,
p.107) comes as no surprise. Even if legislatures are increasingly common in contemporary
authoritarian states and many of them are far from window dressing (Gandhi and Lust-
Okar, 2009), the Chinese case seems still unpromising because congressmen have long been
disparaged as "rubber stamps."
But researchers argue that Chinese congresses are undergoing a substantial change in
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representation and responsiveness. Truex (2016) finds that provincial congress delegates
have become more willing to address issues deemed most serious by the constituents they
claim to represent. For nonpolitical issues, congress delegates have proposed policies that
meaningfully reflect constituent interests; these proposals sometimes embody public pro-
visions. One reason the Chinese government intends to improve congressional responsive-
ness is for information acquisition. Since Chinese leaders have limited information about
citizen interests, they purposefully increase congressional responsiveness to understand
mass preferences better and to placate citizens by providing a minimal standard of welfare
(Truex, 2016, p.5).
Manion (2016) also finds that local congresses (municipal, county, and township level)
have incrementally become more responsive since the Chinese government passed a new
election law in the late 1990s that legalized direct elections of local congresses. Because
current local congress delegates are nominated and elected by citizens, they have stronger
incentive to be responsive. Conducting a large number of interviews and a survey with
5,000 local congress delegates,Manion shows that these delegates frequently use such terms
as voting districts, constituency, and constituent interests. Moreover, most of them view
themselves as representatives and thus side with their geographic constituents. In practice,
local delegates have become more likely than before to take an initiative to advocate the
local government for public goods and services, such as road building, irrigation system,
environmental protection, and social order maintenance. This political change occurred in
local China provides a unique opportunity to examine whether individuals’ perceptions of
government responsiveness prompted by the information about this political change affect
their tax compliance.
Backfire Effects of Exposure to Dissimilar Information The second theoretical building
block derives from research on public opinion and information processing. Political com-
munication scholars have proposed the potential backfire effects of exposure to preference-
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incongruent information (Taber andLodge, 2006; Redlawsk, 2002;Nyhan andReifler, 2010).
Scholars interpret backfire effects as a possible result of the process by which people coun-
terargue dissimilar information and bolster their preexisting views. If people counterar-
gue unwelcome information vigorously enough, they may ultimately adopt opinions and
behaviors in opposition to the direction of the information. In authoritarian countries, re-
cent scholars find that hard propaganda often backfire because heavy-handed persuasive
messages heighten people’s awareness of the absurdity of the regime and the plight of the
country (Huang, 2018). Because many participants in my study seem to exhibit strongly
negative reactions to the information I provided about China’s congressional representa-
tion, the information may produce a backfire effect on citizen compliance.
Hypothesis Based on the aforementioned theoretical perspectives, I hypothesize that the
information about a recent increase in government responsiveness in China has a negative
impact on people’s tax compliance attitudes. Since the political information in the study
contains a persuasive argument that seemswidely considered as government’s propaganda
efforts, people exposed to the information would negatively process it, exerting a backfire
effect on their tax compliance. Themain hypothesis of this study is that individuals exposed
to information about China’s improved congressional representation will have lower tax
compliance than those who are not exposed to the information (H1).
In this paper, I also examine two sources of effect heterogeneity. First, it is possible that
people differ in their abilities to resist persuasive messages (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010). De-
fensive processing of persuasive messages is most likely to occur among individuals with
better political knowledge because they aremore adept at challenging argument-based per-
suasion. I thus hypothesize that the negative treatment effect is stronger among politically
sophisticated respondents (H2).
The other source of effect heterogeneity considered in this study involves people’s self-
monitoring propensity. Gangestad and Snyder (2000) argue that individuals differ in the
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degree towhich theymonitor and regulate their interpersonal behavior in response to social
context. Specifically, high self-monitors are more likely than low self-monitors to carefully
take social cues by tailoring their responses to fit prevailing social expectations. That is,
low self-monitors are more likely than higher self-monitors to reveal their actual attitudes
toward questions with socially desirable answers (e.g., tax compliance). I thus hypothesize
that the negative treatment effect is stronger among low self-monitoring respondents (H3).
4.4 Empirical Strategy
I adopt a survey experiment of Chinese prospective business elites.3 Random assign-
ment of individuals to receive a treatment averts the issue of self-selection into the treat-
ment by balancing out the potential group difference in pretreatment covariates.With the
stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), the average difference in outcomes be-
tween treatment and control groups could be attributed to the treatment. This section in-
cludes discussion of my informational treatment, pilot study, logistical details, measures of
outcome variables, and the moderating variables used to test effect heterogeneity.
4.4.1 Experimental Treatment
The informational treatment is a text-based vignette about China’s increased congres-
sional responsiveness. The vignette contains two pieces of information. The first is that
local congress delegates have become more willing to respond to citizen interests and have
played a greater role in public provisions than before. The second is the incentive of lo-
cal congress delegates in responding to citizen interests. In short, the text-based vignette
conveys what local congress delegates are doing and why they are doing so. The English
translation of the vignette reads as follows:
3This study obtained approval from the IRB of the University of Texas at Austin under protocol 2016-09-0314.
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Treatment Group
People’s Congresses are a fundamental government institution in China. Local
congress delegates meet at least once each year to discuss public policies. A recent
survey of 5,000 local delegates shows that delegates have become more willing to
respond to local people’s interests and take the initiative to advocate for local govern-
ments to offer public services deemed important by people, such as roads, irrigation
systems, and maintaining order. This differs from an earlier time when congress del-
egates seldom delivered public services. But now since township and county dele-
gates are nominated and elected, they need to respond to people to gain a reputation.
Yangzhou Municipal and Taizhou Wenling congresses are two specific examples.
Control Group
People’s Congresses are a fundamental government institution in China. Local
congress delegates meet at least once each year to discuss public policies.
Only respondents in the treatment group received the full vignette; by contrast, those
in the control group received only the first two sentences in the vignette. I thus ensure that
the only difference between the treatment and control group respondents is whether or not
people receive the information about congressional responsiveness.
4.4.2 Pilot Study
In formulating the vignette, I conducted a focus-group discussion and a pilot survey
prior to the main experiment. I had three virtual meetings to discuss congressional politics
with four graduate students and a professor from a major university in Shanghai (Univer-
sity A) in late September 2016. These meetings facilitated the formulation of the content of
the vignette. On November 3, 2016, I launched a pretest of 45 Chinese respondents. This
pretest was designed to understand howChinese people react to the information contained
in the vignette. I asked respondents to provide feedback via three open-ended questions.
Although most of them easily grasped the idea that the message they read is about con-
gressional responsiveness, they generally did not believe the information. Many explicitly
indicated that the political message read like state propaganda and questioned the accuracy
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of the information. I provide more details in the Discussion section.
4.4.3 Logistical Details
This experiment consists of 119 Chinese prospective business elites with full-time work
experience. I started to recruit respondents fromamaster of business administration (MBA)
programat anothermajor university in Shanghai (University B) onNovember 12, 2016. Two
days later, I recruited more respondents from the MBA program at University A. In total, I
successfully recruited 64 MBA students. On November 15, my Chinese partners exploited
their social networks in China to recruitmore respondents. I sent out a survey link to several
Alumni Group Chats on WeChat (weixin) and incentivized them to do the survey through
a feature ofWeChat called "grab the red package" (qianghongbao); as a result 55 respondents
completed the survey. All members in the Alumni Group Chats are university alumni with
a major either in business administration or economics.
Compared to most extant tax experiments that recruit undergraduate students as the
subjects, respondents in this study are more suitable to study tax-related issues. For MBA-
based respondents, the admitted students must have full-time work experience for at least
two years. Using University A as an example, the majority of the respondents have had
more than a four- to five-year work experience. For those non-MBA respondents in the
experiment, I use WeChat to prevent people who are still undergraduates from taking the
survey.
For the experimental flow, respondents began the survey by answering a set of demo-
graphic questions (gender, age, and occupation). Theywere then randomly assigned to one
of two groups: treatment and control groups.4 After reading the vignette, I asked respon-
dents to answer the following question: To what extent do you think local congress delegates are
willing to respond to ordinary people’s interests? This question was designed as a manipula-
4I employ block random assignment to enhance statistical power. I divide respondents into three groups
(two groups for two MBA classes and one group for university alumni) and then use a complete random
assignment in each block.
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tion check. Next, I asked respondents a battery of posttreatment questions about attitudes
toward tax compliance (I discuss these questions in the next section) as well as their polit-
ical knowledge, propensity for self-monitoring, and another set of demographic questions
(party affiliation, monthly income, and residence location) before they exited the survey.
4.4.4 Tax Compliance, Political Sophistication, and Self-Monitoring
The outcome variable is individuals’ attitudes toward tax compliance (i.e., their tax
morale). In choosing the survey instruments, I follow Internal Revenue Service, World
Value Survey, and Afrobarometer, all of which have been widely used in previous studies
on tax compliance (Ali, Fjeldstad and Sjursen, 2014; Cummings et al., 2009; Halla, 2012;
Daude, Gutiérrez and Sánchez, 2013). I use the three survey questions:
1. Accountable: how much do you agree that everyone who cheats on his or her taxes
should be held accountable?
2. Reasonable: how much do you agree that people should just need to pay what they
feel is a fair amount of taxes to government?
3. Acceptable: which statement do you agree the most?
– Tax fraud is unacceptable under any circumstance because it is a matter of prin-
ciple and fairness
– Fraud and taxes are inseparable, as everyone evades taxes to some extent, and
this is how the system is sustainable?
The first two variables—Accountable and Reasonable—are measured on a 7-point Likert
scale, and the third variable—Acceptable—is a binary variable. I then create an index—
Tax Morale—by averaging the standardized values of the three outcome measures. In the
empirical analysis, this index is the main outcome variable. I also report the results using
the three items separately for transparency.
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For political sophistication, I propose six questions (see Supporting Information) to
measure one’s political knowledge; I then add them up and dichotomize the result by the
mean to create a binary variable differentiating high political knowledge (1) from low (0).
Zaller (1992) argues that the best measure of political awareness is tests of neutral factual
information about domestic and international issues. For self-monitoring propensity, I use
six items (see Supporting Information) proposed by Berinsky and Lavine (2011). The six
items are classified into two categories: Positive-keyed items indicate that in a traditional
true-false response format, a response of true is indicative of high self-monitoring propen-
sity. Negative-keyed items suggest that a response of false refers to a high self-monitoring
propensity. Based on the survey responses, I generate a binary variable dichotomized by
the mean to indicate whether a respondent is a low self-monitor (1) or high self-monitor
(0).
Table 4.1 reports summary statistics of all relevant variables, including respondents’
background characteristics, outcome scores, andpolitical sophistication and self-monitoring
propensity.
4.5 Results
Randomization and Manipulation Check The treatment assignment worked properly.
Results from t-test of two independent samples with unequal variance show that all pre-
treatment covariates measured in the survey are balanced across groups. I also examine
the mean differences for MBA and non-MBA respondents, respectively, and the results are
identical. Table 4.2 reports results from three logistic regression models that regress peo-
ple’s treatment condition on their pretreatment covariates. In this table, Model 1 is forMBA
respondents, Model 2 is for non-MBA respondents, and Model 3 is for pooled data. As ex-
pected, no pretreatment covariate predicts respondents’ treatment condition at the .10 sig-
nificance level. Followed by the balance check, I conduct a manipulation check to evaluate
whether the informational treatment works. Remember that the treatment was arguably
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Gender (Female=1) 0.513 0.502 0 1
Age 29.387 4.842 22 51
CCP Membership 0.387 0.489 0 1
Income Category 6.353 2.276 1 10
Marital Status (Married=1) 0.378 0.487 0 1
MBA Program (Yes=1) 0.538 0.501 0 1
Manipulation Check 3.118 0.845 1 5
Tax Morale 0 0.636 -1.6 1.012
Accountable (Standardized) 0 1 -2.449 0.96
Accountable (Unstandardized) 5.311 1.76 1 7
Reasonable (Standardized) 0 1 -1.687 1.273
Reasonable (Unstandardized) 4.42 2.027 1 7
Acceptable (Standardized) 0 1 -1.232 0.805
Acceptable (Unstandardized) 0.605 0.491 0 1
Political Knowledge 2.269 1.406 0 6
Self-Monitoring Propensity 14.008 1.998 9 19
Observations 119
viewed as being associated with state propaganda. The group mean comparison shows
that the treatment significantly lowered respondents’ perceptions of congressional respon-
siveness.
Baseline Result Because the treatment is not a weak one (i.e., it was effective in swaying
perceptions of congressional responsiveness), if the social contract hypothesis is correct, it
should lead people to express lower tax compliance. I find supporting evidence that the
treatment significantly moved people’s tax compliance downward. Figure 4.1 shows that
the informational treatment had a backfire effect on respondents’ willingness to comply
with tax regulations. The coefficient sign of the treatment is consistently negative for all the
outcome measures. The results remain intact after controlling respondents’ background
characteristics. More importantly, the treatment estimates are statistically significant at the
.05 level for two of the three outcome measures. Even though one outcome variable—
Acceptable—does not reach the standard significance level, it is very close to the .1 level.
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Table 4.2: Balanced Test
MBA Non-MBA Pooled
Female -0.0183 0.509 0.264
(0.974) (0.395) (0.506)
Age 0.0106 0.0286 0.0212
(0.899) (0.528) (0.581)
CCP -0.796 0.0662 -0.369
(0.139) (0.911) (0.344)
Income -0.116 -0.204 -0.150
(0.301) (0.184) (0.101)
Political -0.0409 0.128 0.0506
Knowledge (0.836) (0.601) (0.741)
MBA 0.0527
(0.897)
Constant 1.021 0.0121 0.286
(0.720) (0.994) (0.818)
N 64 55 119
p-values in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
This is likely caused by the small sample size. For robustness check, I conduct a principal
component analysis, using the first estimated principal component as the outcome variable.
The treatment estimates remain negative and statistically significant at the .05 level.5
Overall, the results support my main hypothesis (H1) that individuals’ perceptions of
government responsivenesswill influence their tax compliance. Becausemany respondents
negatively processed and reacted to the informational treatment, those exposed to the in-
formation had lower tax compliance than those not exposed. In a nutshell, the political
information viewed as hard propaganda exerted a backfire effect.
Effect Heterogeneity Is the magnitude of the backfire effect conditional on one’s political
knowledge (H2) and/or self-monitoring propensity (H3)? H2 posits that the backfire effect
should be stronger among politically sophisticated respondents because they have better
5TableC.1 in Supplementary Information reports all the regression estimates.
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Figure 4.1: Treatment Effects
Note: The dots represent point estimates and the bars 95% confidence intervals. Tax Morale is an index av-
eraging the standardized scores of the three survey items used to measure compliance attitudes. Robustness
check is a principal component analysis using the first principal component as the outcome. Bivariate model
regresses respondents’ outcomes on the binary treatment condition; multivariate model regresses respon-
dents’ outcomes on their treatment condition and background characteristics. I use linear regression model
to estimate the treatment effects. N=119.
abilities to counterargue dissimilar information. Results reported in Table 4.3 shows no
support for this hypothesis. If anything, the negative treatment effects seem mainly driven
by those respondents with low political awareness.
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Table 4.3: Treatment Effects Moderated by Political Sophistication
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax Morale Accountable Reasonable Acceptable
Treatment -0.309* -0.368* -0.319+ -0.240*
(0.019) (0.035) (0.070) (0.016)
High Knowledge -0.161+ -0.435* 0.0309 -0.0781
(0.079) (0.030) (0.849) (0.543)
Treatment# 0.240 0.298 0.113 0.309
High Knowledge (0.172) (0.186) (0.475) (0.129)
Constant 0.173** 0.308** 0.126* 0.0856
(0.001) (0.003) (0.028) (0.173)
Obs. 119 119 119 119
p-values in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
Table 4.4: Treatment Effects Moderated by Self-Monitoring Propensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax Morale Accountable Reasonable Acceptable
Treatment 0.0109 -0.482** 0.135 0.379+
(0.935) (0.006) (0.445) (0.062)
Low Self-Monitoring 0.302+ 0.0150 0.247 0.643**
(0.076) (0.932) (0.190) (0.009)
Treatment#Low -0.334 0.418+ -0.680** -0.742*
Self-Monitoring (0.114) (0.056) (0.003) (0.040)
Constant -0.0926 0.122 -0.0255 -0.375*
(0.223) (0.191) (0.856) (0.024)
Obs. 119 119 119 119
p-values in parentheses
+ p < .10, ∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
H3 posits that the backfire effect should be stronger among low self-monitors because
these people aremorewilling to reveal their truthful answers to sensitive questions. Results
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in Table 4.4 show that, first, the estimated coefficients of the interaction variable have the
correct direction in three of the four models (Model 1, Model 3, and Model 4) and are sta-
tistically significant for two outcome variables—Reasonable and Acceptable. Nevertheless,
the estimate of the interaction variable in Model 2 has the wrong direction. In sum, even if
some evidence shows that the backfire effect is larger among low self-monitors, one should
be cautious in interpreting the results. My study may be inadequately powered because of
the small sample size.
Together, my main results support both social contract theory and backfire effects of
exposure to dissimilar information. Specifically, I show that even in authoritarian countries
people’s perceptions of government responsiveness also matter with regard to how much
they intend to complywith tax regulations. I also find that persuasivemessages can backfire
if message recipients question their intent and accuracy. Some evidence further suggests
that the backfire effect is particularly salient for low self-monitors.
4.6 Discussion
Why did the informational treatment have a negative impact on people’s tax compliance
attitudes? One plausible answer is that the information recipients did not believe the infor-
mation and counterargue against it. I presented open-ended questions in a pilot study to
gain understanding of people’s opinions about the informational treatment. Although the
subjects in the pilot study differ from those in the main experiment, still some similarities
hold: All respondents share the same academic training (either business administration or
economics), and a majority of respondents are from the same city—Shanghai.
In answering the open-ended questions, most people made negative comments on the
received message. Some regarded the messages as government’s propaganda effort aim-
ing to convince citizens that China’s governing institutions are more responsive. Others
suspected the authenticity of the messages, noting that the message likely came from the
Chinese government and was intended to induce people to believe congressional respon-
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siveness, which in their views is far from the case. Still others mentioned they rarely feel the
existence of local congress delegates in their daily life and thus concluded that the message
does not reflect the reality. Some people further noted that they do not trust official reports
and propaganda materials like the message they just read. They also considered local con-
gressional elections opaque even if the government constantly emphasizes the value of the
elections and the benefits citizens can receive after they occur. The qualitative evidence is
compatible with Stockmann (2013), who claims that Chinese citizens tend to be resistant to
a political message when its source is related to the government (e.g., official newspapers).
Another possible explanation of the negative information processing is that people lack
trust in the political actors in the vignette. The existing literature on persuasion has shown
that when people perceive the actors in a persuasive message as trustworthy, they are more
likely to accept the message (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). Some studies have shown that
Chinese people’s levels of political trust hinge on the hierarchy of governments: The central
government is often perceived as more trustworthy than local governments (Li, 2004). Sta-
tistical results based on the 2008 China Survey also support this argument. Table 4.5 reports
that respondents have significantly higher confidence in the central than in local govern-
ments.6 Tang (2016) also lends empirical evidence that the central government is generally
perceived to be highly responsive to popular needs. Therefore, a case can be made that the
informational treatment in this study could have successfully persuaded the information
recipients had the key political actor in the vignette been the central government.
Table 4.5: Political Trust by Levels of Government
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Central Government 8.170 2.197 0 10 3763
Local Government (County/City) 6.541 2.653 0 10 3702
6The mean scores are calculated by using a survey question asking respondents how much confidence they
have in the Central and local governments. This question is coded in an interval scale from 0 to 10; 0 refers
to least confident and 10 refers to most confident.
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Moreover, the timing of this study may partially contribute to the backfire effect ob-
served. In September 2016, a total of 454 members of the Liaoning province congress left
their positions in the aftermath of widespread allegations of vote buying and bribery. Ear-
lier that year, the Chinese government launched an investigation of this case, resulting in the
ouster of former Liaoning provincial Communist Party headWangMin from the party. This
salient event may negatively affect how people process the information about responsive-
ness and representation of local congress delegates. The Liaoning event may lead people to
call any persuasivemessages concerning improved congressional responsiveness into ques-
tion. Note that all these possible explanations are suggestive and need to be systematically
evaluated in future research.
4.7 Conclusion
Even when individuals’ willingness to pay taxes has long been argued in fiscal contract
theory to depend on their perceptions of government responsiveness, whether the theory
can be applied to authoritarian contexts has been examined in very few studies. I conduct
an experimental investigation to test this theory in China and find supporting evidence.
A more interesting finding is perhaps that my study participants negatively processed the
information about China’s improved congressional representation and as a consequence
the information had a backfire effect on citizen compliance. My qualitative evidence sug-
gests that Chinese people seem to treat the information as associatedwith state propaganda.
The results are not only consistent with a series of complementary belief-preservingmecha-
nisms (Kunda, 1990),7 but are in harmonywith new studies showing that hard propaganda
tends to backfire.
7For example, people’s prior beliefs will affect how they process a new information; people tend to exert effort






Supplementary Information for "Family Matters"
Section A
Public Employment, Proregime Bias, and Parental Transmission. Panel (A) shows that
public employees have stronger proregime attitudes than nongovernment employees. All
regressions includepersonal characteristics as controls and are based on 10multiple-imputed
datasets. Panel (B) focuses on the respondents in this study, showing that affiliated subjects
are more likely to apply for a CCP membership than nonaffiliated subjects
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Table A.1: Intergenerational Transmission
Panel A: Public Employment and Political Attachment
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Trust Satisfaction Pride
Public Employee 0.307* 0.349** 0.092*
(0.178) (0.143) (0.048)
Local Hukou 0.499*** 0.287*** -0.012
(0.106) (0.088) (0.027)
Ethnicity: Han -0.297** -0.098 0.165***
(0.150) (0.117) (0.040)
Gender: Male -0.285*** 0.166** 0.052**
(0.088) (0.073) (0.023)
Age 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant 7.256*** 6.943*** 3.143***
(0.211) (0.170) (0.052)
Observations 3,989 3,989 3,989
Panel B: Odds Ratio of Applying for Party Membership
VARIABLES Party Memership Application















Robust seeform in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Section B
Government Documents. This section discusses five government documents related to
the Eighth Curriculum Reform. I outline each of them below in chronic order.
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• "Decision on Deepening Education Reform, and Promoting Comprehensively the Quality Ed-
ucation" was issued by China’s State Council on June 3, 1999.1 It marks the beginning
of the planning phase of the curriculum reform and, in particular, calls for a reform
of the curriculum content.
• "Decision on Basic Education Reform and Development" was released by the State Council
onMay 29, 2001.2 It reemphasizes that basic education plays a strategic role in facilitat-
ing socialistmodernization. In Section 3, the document briefly introduces government
objectives for the curriculum reform, such as teaching students (socialist) democracy,
the rule of law, and collectivism.
• "Outlines of Basic Education Reform" was issued by China’s Ministry Education on June
8, 2001.3 This is the first main document in which the government outlines the gen-
eral objectives for the high school curriculum reform. It also notes that the government
would establish a corresponding curriculum framework to support the implementa-
tion of the reform.
• "Suggestions on Strengthening the Ideological and Moral Construction of the Youth" was is-
sued by the State Council on February 26, 2004.4 It describes the political objectives
that should be achieved through the high school politics curriculum.
• "Curriculum Framework for the High School Politics Subject," was issued by theMinistry of
Education onMarch 2, 2011.5 It presents the specific goals of the new politics curricu-
lum. Notably, it serves as the guiding framework for textbook authors, high school
1See http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_sjzl/moe_177/tnull_2478.html (Retrieved: 05/01/20).
2See http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2001/content_60920.htm (Retrieved: 05/01/20).
3See http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A26/jcj_kcjcgh/200106/t20010608_167343.html(Retrieved:
05/01/20).
4See http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2004/content_62719.htm (Retrieved: 05/01/20).
5See http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A26/s8001/200403/t20040302_167352.html(Retrieved: 05/01/20).
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teachers, exam preparation book publishers, and high school students (Cantoni et al.,
2017).
Added Sections (Items) in the New Textbooks (College Entrance Exam). Using data
from a text analysis conducted by Cantoni et al. (2017), I list the added sections (items) in
the new textbooks (college entrance exam) with respect to the categories of interest below.
• CHINESE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
– Added Sections in the New Textbooks
∗ Main components of political life
∗ How to participate in political life
∗ The choice of election methods and its basis
∗ Various ways of participating in democratic decision-making
∗ Citizens’ direct participation in democratic decision-making
∗ The most comprehensive democratic practices in China
∗ Orderly and disorderly political participation
– Added Items in the Exam Framework
∗ Chinese citizens’ rights of democratic supervision
∗ Basic principles and content of Chinese citizens participating in political life
∗ Channels for Chinese citizens to participate in political life
∗ China’s election system and method
∗ Various ways for citizens to participate in democratic decision-making
∗ The significance of citizens directly participating in democratic decision-making
∗ The meaning and significance of Chinese villages and urban dwellers gov-
erning themselves
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• CHINESE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
– Added Sections in the New Textbooks
∗ Limitations of market allocation of resources
∗ Basic characteristics of the socialist market economy
∗ Strengthening the state’s macroeconomic regulations and controls
∗ Functions of fiscal policies
∗ How to correctly utilize fiscal policies
∗ The concept of public goods
– Added Items in the Exam Framework
∗ Market adjustment and its limitations
∗ Market allocation of resources
∗ Basic characteristics of the socialist market economy
∗ Public finance and infrastructure construction
∗ Public finance and macroeconomic regulations and controls
∗ Public finance and the guarantee of people’s living standards
• GOVERNANCE
– Added Sections in the New Textbooks
∗ Various methods of democratic supervision
∗ Responsible exercise of the supervision right
∗ A government that benefits its people
∗ Ways to seek help; legal channels to voice complaints
∗ The specific requirements for government to adhere to the rule of law
∗ The significance of restricting and supervising government’s power
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∗ Cheers for the ‘Sunshine Project’ (local government operational transparency
project)
∗ Where does the government’s authority come from?
– Added Items in the Exam Framework
∗ Chinese citizens’ rights of democratic supervision
∗ The legal channels to conduct democratic supervision
∗ Citizens need to exercise the right of democratic supervision in a responsible
manner
∗ The duties of the Chinese government
∗ The fundamental guidelines of the Chinese government; the basic principles
of government operations
∗ The significance and requirement of the rule of law
∗ To improve the government’s ability to adhere to the rule of law
∗ The significance of restricting and supervising government’s power
∗ China’s administrative supervision system
∗ The origin and establishment of the Chinese government’s authority
Translated Excerpts from the New Textbooks. This section provides translated excerpts
from the new textbooks to show how the textbook content related to the outcome of interest
was presented under the new politics curriculum. The textbook excerpts are complemen-
tary to evidence of changes in the frequency ofwords across curricula, which does not reveal
the context surrounding the relevant words, discussed in the main text.
• CHINESE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
– The development of socialist democracy is an important goal for socialist mod-
ernization. To achieve this objective, wemust be under the leadership of the Party
95
and popular sovereignty, governing the country by law (excerpted from "Main
components of political life").
– An essential guarantee for all decisions to meet the fundamental interests of the
public is to elect people who represent the will of the people in democratic elec-
tions to join the decision-making institutions and participate in the review, su-
pervision, and formulation of policies. (excerpted from "Various ways of partic-
ipating in democratic decision-making").
– Citizen participation in the decision-making process through various channels
and approaches is crucial to putting decision-making on a more scientific and
democratic basis (excerpted from "Citizens’ direct participation in democratic
decision-making").
– Developing grassroots democracy and ensuring that people enjoy democratic
rights are fundamental to the country’s development of socialist democracy. ...Ac-
cording to the Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees of the People’s Republic
of China, voting for the members of the Villagers’ Committee directly is an im-
portant basis of villagers’ self-governance. ...According to the Organic Law of
the Urban Residents’ Committee of the People’s Republic of China, the mem-
bers of the Urban Residents’ Committee are democratically elected by residents
(excerpted from "The most comprehensive democratic practices in China").
– Citizens’ orderly and disorderly political participation differs in whether they
engage in democracy in line with the Constitution, laws, regulations, and pro-
cedures; whether they exercise political rights and fulfill political obligations in
accordance with the law. ...Following the Constitution, laws, regulations, and
procedures ensures orderly participation; otherwise disorder, and even chaos,
can be the result (excerpted from "Orderly anddisorderly political participation).
• CHINESE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
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– Market allocations are far from omnipotent. ...The reliance on market allocations
entirely would cause reduced efficiency of resource distributions, giving rise to
the waste of resources; the society and economy become unstable, and economic
fluctuations as well as chaos occur. There will be unfair income distribution,
widening income inequality, and severe polarization (excerpted from "Limita-
tions of market allocation of resources").
– The capitalist market economy is based on private ownership. Upholding the
dominant position of public ownership is the foundation of socialistmarket econ-
omy. ...Socialist market economy enables the country to stretch its advantage
of aggregating human, physical, and financial resources, making the country’s
macro-adjustment and intervention better and more effective (excerpted from
"Basic characteristics of the socialist market economy").
– Macroeconomic regulations and controls are the government’s main responsi-
bilities and functions. ...The country adopts various methods to macro-adjust
the national economy. ...The country applies economic, legal, and administrative
means to implement the objectives of macroeconomic control (excerpted from
"Strengthening the state’s macroeconomic regulation and control").
• GOVERNANCE
– When people exercise their power of supervision, they must have the courage
to fight against evil and use the supervisory power stipulated in the Constitu-
tion and laws for the benefit of the country and the people. Additionally, they
must adopt legal approaches and do not interferewith government activities (ex-
cerpted from "Responsible exercise of the supervision right").
– The government should exercise its power in accordancewith the law and be sub-
ject to people’s supervision. The country is striving to build a government with
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legal authority and responsibilities, strict and impartial law enforcement, open-
ness and justice, integrity and efficiency, and law-abidance and honesty based on
the rule of law (excerpted from "A government that benefits its people").
– The government provides various channels for citizens to seek assistance or file
complaints, such as setting up hotlines, building up a petition system, and estab-
lishing an administrative adjudication system. Citizens should learn to turn to
or file complaints to government departments in accordance with the law, which
can help solve their own difficulties, safeguard their rights and interests, and
keep improving the government in terms of administrative efficiency (excerpted
from "Ways to seek help; legal channels to voice complaints").
– The country operates according to law and endeavors to build a socialist country
with the rule of law. The authority of the government is granted by law, and the
exercise of administrative powers must be based on the Constitution and laws.
This is the so-called administration by law,which is a basic requirement for policy
implementations of the government and the principle of being responsible to its
people (excerpted from "The specific requirements for government to adhere to
the rule of law").
– The country has established a comprehensive administrative supervision system
on the basis of the Constitution and laws. ...The government under supervi-
sion is a guarantee for adhering to the rule of law and administrative efficiency
(excerpted from "The significance of restricting and supervising government’s
power").
– To better serve the people, the government has been promoting transparency
in government activities and public affairs. ...Such transparency helps regulate
the behavior of the government and its officials and enhance the government’s
credibility (excerpted from "Cheers for the ’Sunshine Project’").
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– In the socialist country led by the CCP, the government, which comes from and
serves the people, wins the support of the majority of the people; it represents an
incomparable authority that no governments in history could achieve. The au-
thority of a government is marked when its management and services are recog-
nized and accepted by the people (excerpted from "Where does the government’s
authority come from?").
Section C
Sources of Data. Readers may have noticed that the sample size varies for models using
the Intervention, Democracy, and Trust outcomes. This is caused by the fact that the Chinese
General Social Surveymay change questions across survey waves. Specifically, the Interven-
tion questions were asked in all four waves. The Democracy question was asked only in the
2013 wave. The Trust question has fewer observations because only a subset of respondents
in the 2012 wave was asked the question. Table A.2 indicates which questions were asked
in each wave with a check mark and the associated number of observations.
Table A.2: Sources of Observations from Survey Waves
Intervention Democracy Trust
2010 Round 3(N=392) 7 7
2012 Round 3(N=521) 7 3(N=275)
2013 Round 3(N=584) 3(N=536) 7
2015 Round 3(N=578) 7 7
Total N 2075 536 275
The complete absence of data on particular variables in some survey waves means that
I cannot multiply impute for the missingness. However, I conduct two analyses regard-
ing Intervention to evaluate the robustness of my results. First, I reestimate the effects on
Interventionwhen restricting each model to the number of observations available across in-
dicators in that wave. For example, when analyzing the 2012 wave, I restrict the sample to
the 275 respondents who responded to Trust. For the 2013 wave, I focus on only the 536
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respondents who are available for the analysis in which Democracy is the outcome. In the
waves where neither Trust nor Democracy was recorded, I simply use the respondents from
the survey wave. Figure A.1 reports the separate regression coefficients with correspond-
ing confidence intervals at the .05 and .1 level. Results show that the estimated marginal
effects within each wave are similar to the baseline results, except for the 2012 wave. As
expected, the standard errors become larger as a result of fewer observations. I thus prefer
a larger sample for the analysis of Intervention (i.e., N=2075) in order to have more precise
estimates
Figure A.1: Marginal Effects on Intervention by Survey Waves
Second, I reestimate the coefficient, including survey fixed effects to account for time-
varying factors that could affect respondents differently across survey waves. Results re-
ported in Figure A.2 are nearly identical to the baseline estimates.
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Figure A.2: Marginal Effects on Interventionwith Survey Fixed Effects
Additional Analyses of Intervention. In the main analysis, Intervention is an additive
scale based on three survey items related to people’s attitudes toward state intervention
in citizen life. Here, I first report the interitem correlations.
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3
Item 1 (Criticism of Government)
Item 2 (Number of Children) 0.292
Item 3 (Place to Work and Live) 0.218 0.190
Next, I report the baseline results on each item separately. For comparison and consistency, I
standardize each item to have amean of zero and a standard deviation of one. For reference,
the leftmost panel in Figure A.3 reports the estimates using the additive scale. Results from
the rest of panels show that the estimates for the individual items all have the right direction
and follow a consistent pattern —the coefficients are larger among the affiliated sample
than the nonaffiliated sample. The three estimates also have similar sizes. None are not
statistically significant, however, using a 0.05 two-tailed criterion. One possible explanation
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is that the variation of the items is all smaller than that of the additive scale.
Figure A.3: Separate Marginal Treatment Effects on Intervention Items
I also reestimate the baseline model by using principal component analysis. I first esti-
mate the principal components with the three items and find that only the first estimated
component, which explains 49% of the total variance of the items, has an eigenvalue greater
than one. I then use the first component as the outcome variable to reestimate the treatment
effect. Figure A.4 shows that the new estimates are almost identical to the baseline estimates
using the additive scale.
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Figure A.4: Marginal Treatment Effects on Intervention Using PCA
Section D
Balance Test. Table A.3 reports the results of difference-in-means. Accounting for province
and cohort fixed effects, the OLS estimates show that the treatment and control groups are
indistinguishable in several personal characteristics.
Main Results. Table A.4 shows the OLS estimates of the effects of the new textbooks on
attitudes.
Marginal Effect by Affiliation Status. Table A.5 reports the OLS estimates of the marginal
effects of the new textbooks, calculated based on the results from the baseline model, on
each of the two groups (affiliated and nonaffiliated samples).
Falsification Tests. Table A.6 reports the OLS estimates using placebo attitudes (Panel A)
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and placebo reform years (Placebo B)
Table A.3: Balance Test









Father is CCP Member 0.001
(0.008)
Mother is CCP Member 0.008
(0.008)
Father’s Educational Level 0.004
(0.007)












Standard errors in parentheses

































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.5: Marginal Treatment Effects by Affiliation Status
(1) (2) (3)
Marginal Effects Government Socialist Trust in
Comparison Intervention Democracy Officials
Affiliated Students 0.375** 0.582*** 0.671*
(0.179) (0.215) (0.356)
Nonaffiliated Students 0.075 -0.248 -0.084
(0.085) (0.161) (0.230)
Province FE X X X
Cohort FE X X X
Observations 2,075 536 275
Clustered Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.6: Falsification Tests
Panel A: Placebo Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trust in Trust in Trust in Trust in Trust in
VARIABLES People Relatives Neighbors Bank Staff Journalists
New Curriculum 0.230 0.117 0.039 0.004 0.007
(0.190) (0.132) (0.136) (0.141) (0.179)
Affiliated Student -0.048 0.326** 0.128 0.312** -0.135
(0.174) (0.125) (0.154) (0.121) (0.144)
New Curriculum 0.209 -0.242 -0.238 -0.313 0.232
×Affiliated Student (0.275) (0.167) (0.207) (0.214) (0.255)
Constant 3.363*** 3.384*** 2.655*** 2.889*** 2.273***
(0.129) (0.319) (0.111) (0.114) (0.185)
Province FE X X X X X
Cohort FE X X X X X
Observations 521 280 280 280 276
R-squared 0.095 0.189 0.142 0.181 0.125
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel B: Placebo Reform
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Intervention Democracy Trust
New Curriculum 0.008 0.067 0.015
(0.078) (0.164) (0.269)
Affiliated Student -0.122 -0.202 -0.007
(0.091) (0.181) (0.217)
New Curriculum 0.082 0.281 -0.035
×Affiliated Student (0.131) (0.248) (0.378)
Constant 0.046 0.326*** 0.796***
(0.065) (0.123) (0.255)
Province FE X X X
Cohort FE X X X
Observations 1,796 440 232
R-squared 0.046 0.129 0.189
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




I conduct a series of additional tests to evaluate the robustness of my results. I discuss
each of them below.
• First, one may be concerned about the assumption of my analysis that students start
high school at age 15 because some people might start high school earlier or later. I
use two strategies to address this crossover concern. Had my results been sensitive
to the school entry year assumption, I should not have found any effect in these two
analyses.
– I explore three different bandwidths around the threshold: (1) the cohorts just
one year above and below the reform year, (2) a two-cohort bandwidth on each
side of the curriculum, and (3) a three-cohort bandwidth on each side of the
curriculum. Table A.7 and Figure A.5 show that my results are robust to various
bandwidth selections.
– I reanalyze the data taking people’s birth months into account. In the main anal-
ysis I assume people are 15 when they start high school, but sometimes people
need to have hit the required age by August 31 to start school; one would wait
a whole extra year if her birthday is after that. For example, some aged 16 born
September-December had to wait a year and so they actually went through the
new textbooks, but in the analysis I code them as pre-reform. I recode some re-
spondents’ treatment conditions in light to their birth years and months, finding
that my results are mostly the same (the only exception is Intervention; see Table
A.8 and Figure A.6).
• Second, even if students cannot self-select parents who work for the government, one
may still wonder whether some other feature of these students other than parental
occupation explains their differential responses to the treatment. I address this con-
cern by matching parents’ background characteristics that would affect their public
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employment status, including CCP membership and educational attainment.6 When
implementing the entropy balancing method (Hainmueller, 2012), Table A.9 and Fig-
ure A.7 show that my results from a reweighted sample are still robust.
• Third, onemaywonderwhether the inclusion of individual-level controlswould over-
turn the results. I reanalyze the data by adding several individual controls. To avoid
posttreatment bias, I first include factors occurring before students start high school
(i.e., before exposure to politics textbooks), such as gender, ethnicity, household reg-
istration, parents’ Party membership, and parents’ educational attainment. In an al-
ternative specification, I add a series of posttreatment variables potentially correlated
with people’s political attitudes, such as a person’s educational attainment, frequency
of media use, CCP membership, and perceived socioeconomic condition. Table A.10
and Figure A.8 show that the results are stable.
• Fourth, because the introduction dates of the new curriculum were not randomly as-
signed across provinces, a concern is that factors determining the introduction dates
instead of the new curriculum may affect individuals’ attitudes. I reanalyze the data
by taking into account province-level income in 2003, a powerful predictor of earlier
adoption of the new curriculum (Cantoni et al., 2017). Specifically, I control for the
interaction between a province’s 2003 gross regional product per capita and the co-
hort fixed effects. Table A.11 and Figure A.9 show that including these controls does
not considerably affect my findings.
• Fifth, I reanalyze the data by including a full set of province fixed effects interacted
with cohort-level trends. This model specification allows each province to have its
own linear trend in attitudes across cohorts, addressing the concern that trends in
the attitudes across the cohort in provinces may generate the differences in attitudes
6Granted, many other factors could affect public employment status, but the parental information in the sur-
vey I can use is rather limited.
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that I attribute to the new politics textbooks. Table A.12 and Figure A.10 show that
controlling for province-specific, cross-cohort trends does not substantially change the
results.
• Sixth, I use amore demandingmodel, inwhich the interaction terms betweenprovince
and cohort fixed effects are included, to address the unobservable province and cohort
covarying characteristics. Results reported in Table A.13 show that this model does
not qualitatively change my results, although the estimate on Intervention becomes
less precise because of a great number of new parameters added to the model.
• Seventh, I reanalyze data Using imputed data for missing values. Table A.14 and
Figure A.11 show that the results are very similar to the ones using listwise deletion



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.8: Robustness Check: Birth Months
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Intervention Democracy Trust
New Curriculum -0.154*** -0.244 -0.194
(0.055) (0.150) (0.210)
Affiliated Student -0.274*** -0.165 -0.097
(0.100) (0.160) (0.216)
New Curriculum 0.388* 0.726*** 0.845***
×Affiliated Students (0.207) (0.211) (0.294)
Province FE X X X
Cohort FE X X X
Observations 2,075 536 275
R-squared 0.049 0.064 0.198
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This regression table shows the OLS estimates of the effects of the new textbooks, taking respondents’
birth months into account when coding their treatment conditions. The regression coefficients are standard-
ized. Standard errors are clustered at the province × cohort level.
Table A.9: Robustness Check: Matching Analysis
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Intervention Democracy Trust
New Curriculum 0.113 -0.558 0.129
(0.173) (0.343) (0.279)
Affiliated Student -0.282** -0.556*** -0.207
(0.116) (0.212) (0.229)
New Curriculum 0.376** 1.219*** 0.642**
×Affiliated Student (0.176) (0.288) (0.280)
Province FE X X X
Cohort FE X X X
Observations 2,014 524 271
R-squared 0.128 0.225 0.344
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This regression table shows themain results using a reweighted sample that matches on parents’ public
employment status. The regression coefficients are standardized. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table A.10: Robustness Check: Inclusion of Individual Controls
Pre-Treatment Pre- and Post-Treatment
VARIABLES Intervention Democracy Trust Intervention Democracy Trust
New Curriculum 0.113 -0.217 -0.113 0.109 -0.260 -0.076
(0.088) (0.161) (0.235) (0.087) (0.161) (0.240)
Affiliated Student -0.190 -0.322 -0.183 -0.212* -0.367* -0.127
(0.123) (0.195) (0.281) (0.123) (0.194) (0.287)
New Curriculum 0.299* 0.891*** 0.740** 0.317* 0.875*** 0.690*
×Affiliated Student (0.174) (0.211) (0.343) (0.174) (0.213) (0.356)
Gender (Male=1) -0.012 0.294** 0.164 -0.010 0.309** 0.102
(0.078) (0.121) (0.246) (0.077) (0.131) (0.255)
Ethnicity (Han=1) -0.032 -0.053 0.086 -0.005 -0.084 0.108
(0.115) (0.182) (0.253) (0.111) (0.183) (0.263)
Height -0.003 -0.017* -0.016 -0.002 -0.017* -0.014
(0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012)
Hukou (Rural=1) 0.017 -0.146* 0.187 -0.022 -0.158* 0.154
(0.071) (0.087) (0.168) (0.072) (0.088) (0.168)
CCP Father 0.123* 0.057 -0.127 0.165** 0.069 -0.113
(0.066) (0.127) (0.185) (0.067) (0.130) (0.216)
CCP Mother -0.266*** -0.046 0.273 -0.199** 0.102 0.270
(0.078) (0.353) (0.253) (0.080) (0.339) (0.260)
Father’s Education -0.021* -0.038 0.029 -0.020 -0.044 0.037
(0.012) (0.030) (0.030) (0.012) (0.030) (0.032)
Mother’s Education -0.029** 0.032 0.000 -0.026* 0.026 0.009
(0.014) (0.028) (0.035) (0.014) (0.028) (0.034)
Edu. Attainment 0.001 0.041* -0.033
(0.010) (0.021) (0.029)
Internet Usage -0.131*** -0.027 -0.093
(0.027) (0.050) (0.076)
Social Status 0.022 0.014 -0.029
(0.016) (0.040) (0.046)
CCP Membership -0.171*** -0.093 -0.014
(0.060) (0.174) (0.311)
Province FE X X X X X X
Cohort FE X X X X X X
Observations 2,010 523 271 1,995 518 270
R-squared 0.068 0.097 0.211 0.087 0.108 0.223
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This regression table reports the OLS estimates of the effect of the new textbooks with pretreatment
and posttreatment individual-level controls. Standard errors are clustered at the province × cohort level.
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Table A.11: Robustness Check: Addressing Non-Randomized Reform
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Intervention Democracy Trust
New Curriculum 0.058 -0.240 -0.020
(0.088) (0.172) (0.189)
Affiliated Student -0.316*** -0.310* -0.088
(0.119) (0.187) (0.225)
New Curriculum 0.292* 0.768*** 0.535**
×Affiliated Student (0.172) (0.210) (0.256)
Province FE X X X
Cohort FE X X X
Observations 2,075 536 275
R-squared 0.050 0.085 0.227
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This regression table shows the OLS estimates of the effect of the new textbooks accounting for inter-
action terms between provincial gross regional product per capita in 2003 and the cohort fixed effects. The
regressions coefficients are standardized. Standard errors are clustered at the province × cohort level.
Table A.12: Robustness Check: Province-Specific, Cross Cohort Linear Trend
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Intervention Democracy Trust
New Curriculum 0.070 -0.267 -0.035
(0.081) (0.163) (0.261)
Affiliated Student -0.305** -0.273 -0.177
(0.120) (0.186) (0.291)
New Curriculum 0.301* 0.786*** 0.701**
×Affiliated Student (0.172) (0.211) (0.348)
Province FE X X X
Cohort FE X X X
Linear Trend X X X
Observations 2,075 536 275
R-squared 0.062 0.124 0.242
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This regression table reports the OLS estimates of the effects of the new textbooks, accounting for
(linear) trend across cohorts within a province. The regression coefficients are standardized. Standard errors
are clustered at the province × cohort level.
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Table A.13: Robustness Check: A Tighter Model Specification
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Intervention Democracy Trust
New Curriculum -0.691 -0.927 -0.632
(0.639) (0.725) (0.595)
Affiliated Student -0.317*** -0.408* -0.171
(0.117) (0.245) (0.407)
New Curriculum 0.205 0.943*** 1.001**
×Affiliated Student (0.169) (0.307) (0.484)
Province FE X X X
Cohort FE X X X
Province FE x Cohort FE X X X
Observations 2,075 536 275
R-squared 0.123 0.284 0.456
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This regression table presents the OLS estimates of the effects of new textbooks using a tighter model
specification, in which a full set of interaction terms between province fixed effects and cohort fixed effects
are included. The regression coefficients are standardized.
Table A.14: Robustness Check: Multiple Imputation
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Intervention Democracy Trust
New Curriculum 0.079 -0.234 -0.013
(0.085) (0.195) (0.233)
Affiliated Student -0.303** -0.352 -0.185
(0.118) (0.219) (0.256)
New Curriculum 0.288* 0.922*** 0.724**
×Affiliated Student (0.170) (0.282) (0.295)
Province FE X X X
Cohort FE X X X
Observations 2,092 588 280
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This regression table reports theOLS estimates of the effects of the new textbooks based on tenmultiple-
imputeddatasets. Themissing values are imputed byAmelia in R. The regression coefficients are standardized.
Standard errors are clustered at the province × cohort level.
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Table A.15: Mechanism Test: Parental Indoctrination
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Intervention Democracy Trust
Affiliated Respondents 0.014 -0.292 -0.034
(0 versus 1) (0.289) (0.471) (0.607)
Constant -0.108 -0.088 -0.172
(0.089) (0.137) (0.610)
Province FE X X X
Cohort FE X X X
Observations 1,106 268 114
R-squared 0.096 0.157 0.278
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This regression table shows the mean differences in the targeted attitudes between affiliated and non-
affiliated respondents who did not attend high school during the reform period. Results are based on a five-
cohort bandwidth on each side of the curriculum. The regression coefficients are standardized. Standard
errors are clustered at the province × cohort level.
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The Effects of the New Textbooks
Note: This coefficient plot shows the marginal effects of the new textbooks using different bandwidths (+/-
1, +/-2, and +/-3). The bullet symbols represent the standardized coefficients and the bars 95% confidence
intervals.
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Note: This coefficient plot presents the OLS estimates of the marginal effects of the new textbooks, taking
respondents’ birthmonths into accountwhen coding their treatment conditions. The bullet symbols represent
the standardized coefficients and the bars 95% confidence intervals.









−1 0 1 2




Note:This coefficient plot shows the OLS estimates of the marginal effects of the new textbooks using a
reweighted sample generated by the entropy balancing method. The bullet symbols represent the standard-
ized coefficients and the bars 95% confidence intervals.
118



















−.5 0 .5 1 1.5
Government Intervention Index
Support for Socialist Democracy
Trust in Government Officials
Pretreatment Controls All Individual Controls
The Effects of the New Textbooks
Note: This coefficient plot presents the OLS estimates of the marginal effects of the new textbooks, controlling
for a battery of personal characteristics. The bullet symbols represent the standardized coefficients and the
bars 95% confidence intervals.
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Note: This coefficient plot shows theOLS estimates of themarginal effects of the new textbooks, controlling for
interaction terms between provincial GRP Per Capital and cohort fixed effects. The bullet symbols represent
the standardized coefficients and the bars 90% confidence intervals.
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Note: This coefficient plot presents the OLS estimates of the marginal effects of the new textbooks, allow-
ing each province to have its own linear trend in attitudes across cohorts. The bullet symbols represent the
standardized coefficients and the bars 95% confidence intervals.
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Note: This coefficient plot shows the OLS estimates of the marginal effects of the new textbooks. The bul-
let symbols represent the standardized coefficients and the bars 95% confidence intervals. The regression
estimates are based on 10 multiple-imputed datasets to cope with missing values.
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Appendix B
Supplementary Information for "How the Pro-Beijing
Media Influences Voters"
122
Figure B.1: Screenshot of the Invitation Email (English-translated)
123
Figure B.2: Screenshot of the Treatment Website’s Front Page (English-translated)
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Figure B.3: Distribution of Average Browsing Time
Note: The figure excludes those participants who never return to the site after the first visit and those inactive
participants who spend more than 15 minutes per day on average (ten participants, three of them did not
participate in the endline survey). In total, the figure contains 609 participants (439 in the treatment group
and 170 in the placebo group). For the treatment group the average time is 187.25 seconds; for the placebo
group it is 190.51 seconds. I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the average duration of the two groups is
indistinguishable (Coefficient= 3.26 seconds (s.e. = 14.08); p-value= .817, two-tailed).
Figure B.4: Panel View of Browsing Behavior across Individual and Time
Note: The figure is a panel view of website browsing activities across individual and time. A red rectangle
means that a participant was “treated” by the news articles from a given publication date. The figure excludes
participants who never visit the website throughout the study period.
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Figure B.5: Baseline Mean Scores of Beliefs on China by Political Priors
Note: The bar represents 95% confidence interval of the mean. I record the survey responses, if necessary, to
make higher value represent more positive, favorable to China.
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Section B. Text Analysis
I conduct a sentiment analysis of the news articles presented on the treatment website.
Among all the 106 political news articles that study participants could read on the website,
62 of them attached more positive sentiment in coverage, and 44 of them attached more
negative sentiment. We also find that positive articles are shorter in length than negative ar-
ticles. More importantly, after a careful reading of each news article, I find that the majority
of the positive articles deal with China-related issues (e.g., Belt-and-Road, One-Country-
Two-Systems/cross-strait relations, Xi Jinping’s 2020 New Year speech, China-Japan-South
Korea free trade agreement, and restoration of Hong Kong’s stability) and Han’s political
campaign. By contrast The China Times attached more negative sentiment in news coverage
on issues of the incumbent Tsai and her political party, the Anti-Infiltration Act (a law regu-
lating the influence of entities deemed foreign hostile forces on Taiwan’s political processes
such as elections), Hong Kong protesters, and conflicts between Iran and the United States.
Figure B.6: Sentiment Analysis
130
Section C: Descriptive Statistics, Baseline Outcome Scores by Experimen-
tal Conditions, and Sample Selection Bias
131
Table B.2: Summary Statistics
N Mean SD Min Max
Panel A: All Participants
Vote for Han
Baseline 2,077 0.18 0.39 0 1
Endline 815 0.34 0.48 0 1
Change Score 815 0.12 0.43 -1 1
Candidate Evaluation
Baseline 2,077 -1.32 4.42 -9 9
Endline 949 -1.19 5.06 -9 9
Change Score 949 0.04 3.39 -18 18
Pro-China Index
Baseline 2,077 2.85 0.9 1 5
Endline 949 2.97 1.03 1 5.6
Change Score 949 0.11 0.84 -3.4 4.2
Political Predispositions
Pan-Blue 2,077 0.31 0.46 0 1
Independent 2,077 0.4 0.49 0 1
Pan-Green 2,077 0.29 0.46 0 1
Panel B: Experimental Participant
Vote for Han
Baseline 1882 0.17 0.37 0 1
Endline 738 0.33 0.47 0 1
Change Score 738 0.14 0.43 -1 1
Candidate Evaluation
Baseline 1882 -1.51 4.32 -9 9
Endline 861 -1.35 5.07 -9 9
Change Score 861 0.06 3.35 -12 18
Pro-China Index
Baseline 1882 2.8 0.88 1 5.6
Endline 861 2.95 1.04 1 5.6
Change Score 861 0.12 0.85 -3.4 4.2
Political Predisposition
Pan-Blue 1882 0.28 0.45 0 1
Independent 1882 0.42 0.49 0 1
Pan-Green 1882 0.3 0.46 0 1
Panel C: Nonexperimental Participants
Vote for Han
Baseline 195 0.34 0.47 0 1
Endline 77 0.45 0.5 0 1
Change Score 77 0.08 0.53 -1 1
Candidate Evaluation
Baseline 195 0.57 4.9 -9 9
Endline 88 0.44 4.66 -9 9
Change Score 88 -0.1 3.76 -18 11
Pro-China Index
Baseline 195 3.25 0.99 1 5.6
Endline 88 3.16 0.92 1 5.4
Change Score 88 0.05 0.73 -1.8 2.8
Political Predisposition
Pan-Blue 195 0.52 0.5 0 1
Independent 195 0.23 0.42 0 1
Pan-Green 195 0.25 0.43 0 1
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics of outcome variables and political priors among all study par-
ticipants (Panel A), experimental participants (Panel B), and nonexperimental participants (Panel C).
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Figure B.7: Baseline Outcome Scores by Experimental Conditions
Note: The figure reports the mean outcome scores measured in the baseline survey (i.e., before the experi-
ment) by experimental conditions. Estimates are drawn from the experimental sample (N=1,882). The bars
indicate 95% CI. Results show that the scores are balanced across conditions, suggesting randomization was
conducted properly.
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Figure B.8: Analysis of Participation in the Endline Survey, Probit
Note: The figure reports the probit estimates of participation in the endline survey (N=1,882). All background
variables (except assignment to treatment) are from the baseline survey. The bars indicate 95% CI.
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Section D. Comparison of Control Group and Placebo Group
Table B.3: Comparison of Placebo Group and Control Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Vote for Vote for Favor. Favor. China Anti-Infi.
Han Tsai Han Tsai Index Act
Placebo 0.0238 0.149 -0.0244 0.00875 0.0318 0.102
(0.250) (1.330) (-0.27) (0.090) (0.390) (1.090)
Constant -0.139* 0.0655 -0.0803 0.0703 -0.146* -0.176*
(-2.15) (0.910) (-1.45) (1.230) (-3.20) (-3.03)
N 355 355 424 424 424 424
t statistics in parentheses + p<0.10, * p<0.05
Note: Comparison of standardized means in outcome scores, among participants in the control group, who
were in the status quo between survey waves, and those in the placebo group, who received daily invitations
to visit a news website containing real entertainment news from The China Times. The baseline group is the
control group; the coefficients refer to (standardized) mean differences between the two groups.
Table B.4: Comparison of Placebo Group and Control Group on Pro-China Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Favor. China Trade w/ HK Radical
China Threat China Protest Behavior
Placebo -0.028 0.049 0.101 0.001 0.038
(-0.34) (0.520) (1.020) (0.010) (0.390)
Constant -0.081 -0.107+ -0.155* -0.083 -0.084
(-1.53) (-1.77) (-2.79) (-1.65) (-1.41)
N 424 424 424 424 424
t statistics in parentheses + p<0.10, * p<0.05
Note: Comparison of standardized means in five survey questions used to generate China Index between the
control group and placebo group. The baseline group is the control group.
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Section E. Pro-China Index Breakdown
Figure B.9: Regression Coefficients on China-Related Variables
136
Table B.5: Treatment Effects on Pro-China Index, Breakdown
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Favor. China Trade w/ HK Radical
China Threat China Protest Behavior
Panel A: ITT
Treatment 0.167* 0.189** 0.224** 0.188** 0.188**
(2.470) (2.780) (3.290) (2.810) (2.760)
Constant -0.0918* -0.0879+ -0.116* -0.0829+ (0.070)
(-2.27) (-1.90) (-2.48) (-1.90) (-1.49)
Panel B: Two-stage Estimates
Complier 0.671* 0.761** 0.901** 0.758** 0.757**
(2.440) (2.730) (3.100) (2.730) (2.680)
Constant -0.212** -0.224* -0.277** -0.219* -0.206*
(-2.58) (-2.49) (-2.97) (-2.51) (-2.22)
N 861 861 861 861 861
t statistics in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: This table reports standardized coefficients of ITT (panel A) and TOT (panel B) effects on questions
about attitudes toward China-related issues. We use these variables to generate the China Index.
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Section F. Vote Intent of Experimental Participants
Table B.6: Baseline Vote Intent among Experimental Participants
Han Tsai Song Undecided Obs.
Pan-Blue N=264 N=48 N=60 N=162 534
(49.40%) (8.90%) (11.24%) (30.30%)
Pan-Green N=5 N=442 N=21 N=95 563
(0.89%) (78.50%) (3.73%) (16.90%)
Independent N=42 N=178 N=77 N=488 785
(5.35%) (22.68%) (9.80%) (62.10%)
Note: I asked all study participants in the baseline survey which candidate they would vote for if the 2020
Presidential Election were held today. The table is survey responses from those participants who are not
existing consumers of The China Times and thus are in the experimental sample (N=1882).
Table B.7: Baseline Vote Intent among Experimental Participants Completing the Endline
Han Tsai Song Undecided Obs.
Pan-Blue N=133 N=21 N=28 N=69 251
(52.99%) (8.37%) (11.16%) (27.49%)
Pan-Green N=1 N=208 N=9 N=40 258
(0.39%) (80.62%) (3.49%) (15.50%)
Independent N=22 N=84 N=38 N=208 352
(6.25%) (23.86%) (10.80%) (59.09%)
Note: I asked all study participants in the baseline survey which candidate they would vote for if the 2020
Presidential Election were held today. The table shows survey responses from those participants who are in
the experimental sample and have completed both baseline and endline surveys (N=861).
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Table B.8: HowThoseVotingHanChanged fromVote Intent to RealizedChoice (descriptive
statistics by conditions)
From Tsai From Soong From Undecided No Change Obs.
Control 5 (0.096%) 4 (0.076%) 17 (0.325%) 26 (0.50%) 52
Placebo 1 (0.023%) 2 (0.047%) 15 (0.357%) 24 (0.571%) 42
Treatment 11 (0.072%) 12 (0.078%) 63 (0.414%) 66 (0.434%) 152
Note: The column indicates how participants who voted for Han in election moved from their vote intent
measured in the baseline survey. Four possible scenarios are: (1) Tsai to Han: participants initially intended
to vote for Tsai Ing-wen before the experiment and selected Han Kuo-yu in the election. (2) Soong to Han:
participants initially intended to vote for James Soong and selected Han Kuo-yu in the election. I view this
change as partial conversion. (3) Undecided to Han: participants were initially undecided in the baseline
and voted for Han Kuo-yu in the election. (4) No change: participants intended to vote Han Kuo-yu in the
baseline and selected him in the election. This table provides information about how the treatment moved
the vote. It shows that the effects occur mainly by persuading undecided voters rather than converting voters
away from their initial vote intention.
Table B.9: Conversion, Activation, and Reinforcement among Partisan Participants
Conversion Partial Conversion Home Activation No Obs.
Away Conversion (Tsai/Soong) Change
Control 1 (0.023%) 0 (0%) 3/3 (0.142%) 11 (0.261%) 24 (0.571%) 42
Placebo 1 (0.035%) 0 (0%) 0/1 (0.035%) 6 (0.214%) 20 (0.714%) 28
Treatment 0 (0%) 2 (0.02%) 6/10 (0.161%) 21 (0.212%) 60 (0.606%) 99
Note: Among pan-Blue and pan-Green participants who choose Han in the election. Conversion Away refers
to pan-Green participants who initially intend to choose Tsai ultimately vote for Han. Partial Conversion
refers to undecided pan-Green participants vote for Han in the election. Conversion Home refers to pan-
Blue participants who initially intend to choose (Tsai/Soong) ultimately vote for Han. Activation refers to
undecided pan-Blue participants vote for Han in the election. No Change (or reinforcement) refers to pan-
Blue (pan-Green) participants who intend to choose Han vote for Han. N=169
Table B.10: How Independent Participants who Selected Han Changed from Vote Intent to
Realized Choice (descriptive statistics by conditions)
From Tsai From Soong From Undecided No Change Obs.
Control 1 (0.10%) 1 (0.10%) 6 (0.60%) 2 (0.20%) 10
Placebo 0 (0%) 1 (0.07%) 9 (0.64%) 4 (0.28%) 14
Treatment 5 (0.09%) 2 (0.04%) 40 (0.75%) 6 (0.11%) 53
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Appendix C
Supplementary Information for "Persuasive Backfiring"
Survey Questionnaire for Key Variables
I. Manipulation Check
• In general, do you think to what extent local congress delegates are willing to respond
ordinary people’s interests?
II. Outcome Variables
• Everyone who cheats on their taxes should be held accountable (Accountable)
• People should just have to pay what they feel is a fair amount of taxes to governments
(Reasonable)
• Which of these expressions you agree with the most (Acceptable)
– Tax fraud is unacceptable under any circumstance. It is a matter of principle and
fairness.
– Fraud and taxes are inseparable, everyone evades taxes to some extent, and this
is how the system is sustainable.
III. Moderators
• Political Sophistication
– Who is not the current members of the Politburo Standing Committee?
– Other than CCP, how many political parties are there in China?
– When did the central government implement tax-sharing reform?
– Where is the headquarter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?
– Who is the current chairman of the standing committee of the National People’s
Congress?
– Who is the current Prime Minister of the United Kingdom?
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• Self-Monitoring (The first three items refer to positive-keyed items and the following
three are negative-keyed items)
– I put on a show to impress or entertain others
– I would probably make a good actor
– In a group of people, I am rarely the center of attention
– At a party, I let others keep the jokes and stories going
– I can make speeches on the spot even on topics on which I have almost no infor-
mation
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